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ABSTRACT
Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) is a
technique for obtaining economies of scale in spares acquisition by-
placing orders for spares concurrently with other customer's orders
for items requiring the same, or similar, materials and processes.
Coordinating such procurement actions to optimize savings,
particularly replenishment actions, can be a difficult and time
consuming process. The difficulties involved in implementing the
technique raise questions with respect to the utility of the
technique in achieving savings, the circumstances, if any, under
which it should be used, and whether a process can be developed to
make implementation of the technique easier and more systematic.
This thesis explores these questions from a Naval aviation
perspective" and concludes that the technique is worth the effort,
but some processes used to implement it are of questionable value.
A revised transactional model that builds on an earlier prototype
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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) spends vast
sums of money to acquire the most sophisticated weapon systems
in the world. Maintaining these systems in a state of high
operational readiness is vital to the national defense and to
maintaining the credibility of America's power projection
capability. These systems are far from immune to failure, so
maintaining them in a high state of operational readiness
requires ready access to replacement parts to repair them.
Collectively, replacement parts in DoD, comprising both repair
parts (consumable bits and pieces) and spare parts (repairable
components or assemblies) are called "spares" [Ref. l:p. 15-
16] .
DoD maintains an inventory of approximately four million
spares [Ref. 2:p. 1] . In FY 1989, $5.8 billion of the defense
budget was devoted to spares procurement. Though that figure
represents only 2 percent of the total DoD FY 19 89, it is
still a very large sum of money, so Congressional, public, and
service concern over how these spares are acquired and managed
is quite strong [Ref. 2:p. 1] . The well known spares acquisi-
tion "horror stories" publicized in the 1980s - $435 for a
hammer, $110 for a diode, $9000 for an alien wrench, etc. -
are still painful memories. The public outrage and Congres-
sional concern over these incidents placed DoD's acquisition
policies and procedures under a microscope. In response,
Caspar Weinberger, as Secretary of Defense in 1983, issued a
ten point memorandum on spare parts procurement within DoD.
The memorandum directed increased competition, reform of basic
contract procedures, and intolerance of unfair or fraudulent
pricing practices [Ref. 2:p. 129]. Legislation followed that
codified much of the reform initiatives already undertaken by
DoD. Most notable were the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984 and the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1985.
The Navy, whose own in-house audits revealed several of
the procurement "horror stories," moved out ahead of the
legislation to improve its spare parts procurement practices.
The Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) program was established in
August 1983 along with the Price Fighter initiative [Ref. 2:p.
117]. The BOSS program lists six major responsibilities for
commands involved in the spares procurement process:
• Ensure the payment of fair and reasonable prices for spare
parts and material.
• Promote competition in contracting for spares.
• Minimize use of nonstandard items.
• Encourage procurement of spares concurrent with production
runs of end items
.
• Stress Project BOSS initiatives as inspection items where
applicable.
Provide performance and financial data necessary for the
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) to execute lead
systems command responsibilities for the BOSS Program.
[Ref. 3:p. 2]
The most widely recognized aspect of the BOSS program was
the emphasis on "Breakout" - buying spares from the original
manufacturer instead of the prime contractor. DoD and the
Navy have made great strides in this area as noted by the DoD
Inspector General (IG) . In 19 88, the DoD IG estimated
Breakout savings to be $633.8 million [Ref. 4:p. i] . Though
Breakout was the principal method recommended for achieving
savings in spares procurement, other methods were also
stressed, including procuring spares concurrently with end
item production as noted above.
DoD implementation of the policy whereby spares are
purchased concurrently with end item production is called
Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) . It is
a simple, common sense idea for taking advantage of economies
of scale in spare part and production end item acquisition.
In the early 80s, the widely accepted estimate for savings
that could result from the SAIP technique was 15 percent [Ref.
5:p. 3-12]
.
Although simple in concept, the nature of the spares
acquisition process may make consolidating spares procurement
with end item production very difficult. Often, the commands
which have responsibility for purchasing spares (inventory
control points) are separate from those having responsibility
for purchasing end item production units (systems commands)
.
Since the contracting process in either command is complex and
time consuming, attempting to coordinate a simultaneous
purchase while meeting contractor production ordering windows
can be a daunting task. [Ref . 6]
Although SAIP promises greater savings in the spares
acquisition process, existing literature and instructions
provide little guidance on what factors should be "considered"
when deciding whether to use SAIP. There is also little
current guidance on how SAIP should be implemented in those
instances where it seems appropriate to use it. Considering
the complexities of the process, the difficulties of coordina-
tion, and the lack of guidance, it should be no surprise that
more progress has been made in implementing Breakout than in
consolidating spares purchases with production end item
purchases
.
Continued cuts in defense funding in the 1990s will keep
the pressure on for Government buying offices to find ways to
do more with less. In this environment, no option for
improving the efficiency of Government acquisition processes
should be ignored. It is for this reason that the Navy
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) are interested in taking a fresh look at Spares
Acquisition Integrated with Production. Should they do it?
When should they do it? How should they do it? These are the
broad issues that this study will examine.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are to determine what
factors should be considered in deciding whether to use SAIP
in procuring spares for Naval aircraft and methods and
processes to facilitate coordination of the SAIP effort
between NAVAIR and ASO. Additionally, it is hoped that a
systematic approach to identifying appropriate SAIP candidates
and resolving any conflicts between SAIP and other acquisition
policies could help to ensure that the promises of SAIP -
greater efficiency and savings - can be realized.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the research objectives the primary research
question was:
What are the essential characteristics of the Spares
Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) concept and what
factors are critical to successful application of the concept
to spares procurement for Naval aviation weapon systems?
The following subsidiary questions were developed to
facilitate answering the primary research question:
• What is the SAIP concept and what are the presumed
benefits of the concept?
• To what extent have the presumed benefits of the SAIP
concept been realized in historical application of the
concept?
• What factors have been critical to the success or failure
of SAIP?
What are the key issues that must be addressed or resolved
in applying the SAIP concept to spares procurement for
Naval aviation weapon systems?
To what extent should the SAIP concept be applied to
spares procurement for Naval aviation weapon systems and
how can it best be implemented to optimize program
results?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The study concentrated on SAIP as it applies to Naval
aviation and coordination between NAVAIR and ASO. Additional
research was conducted into how other services execute the
SAIP technique. The intent of this additional research was to
gather other service experiences and procedures that might be
applicable to Naval aviation.
Consideration was given to spares acquisition integrated
with weapon system production, but not to examining the issue
of integrating ASO in- house procurement of Shop Repairable
Assembly (SRA) spares with in -house procurement of Weapons
Replaceable Assembly (WRA) spares. The intent was to deter-
mine the validity of theoretical SAIP benefits and provide
management guidance and information for ASO and NAVAIR to
facilitate consideration and implementation of the SAIP
concept
.
The development of a draft instruction or a transactional
model for more systematic application of the SAIP technique
were central to the study. It is assumed that the reader is
familiar with standard DoD acquisition concepts and the
aviation logistics environment within the Department of the
Navy.
E . METHODOLOGY
The research was initiated with a comprehensive review of
available literature on the spares acquisition process in
general and on the SAIP process in specific. After sufficient
background information was obtained from the literature
review, mail surveys and telephone interviews were conducted
with Government and contractor personnel highly experienced in
the Government spares acquisition process and SAIP in particu-
lar. Finally, on-site research was conducted at ASO and
NAVAIR
.
The literature reviewed in the study was obtained through
the Naval Air Systems Command, the Naval Postgraduate School
Library,- and the Defense Logistics Information Exchange
(DLSIE) . Relatively little literature was available specifi-
cally on the SAIP process.
Telephone interviews were conducted with mail survey
respondents who expressed the greatest interest and expertise
in the research area. These interviews were intended to
either clarify or more fully develop information provided in
response to the mail surveys, so they were generally informal,
free flowing exchanges centered around the survey responses.
On-site research was conducted to develop a full under-
standing of ASO and NAVAIR internal procedures and to review
historical files and records that would shed light on the
efficacy of the SAIP process.
Smith's A Guide to Business Research and Rea and Parker's
Designing and Conducting Survey Research were very helpful in
designing the questionnaires and in preparing for personal
interviews [Ref. 7:p. 61-78, Ref. 8:p. 61-79].
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following definitions will be useful in understanding
the conceptual and operational discussions presented in this
study:
• Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) . A negotiated instrument
of understanding between a contracting office and a
contractor that contains (1) terms and conditions that
will apply to future contracts (orders) between the
parties during the term of the agreement, (2) a descrip-
tion, as specific as practicable, of the supplies or
services to be provided, and (3) methods for the pricing
and issuing of orders under the BOA. [Ref. 9: p. 16.703-1]
• Breakout. Detailed technical data screening to identify
items which can be procured from other than the historic
sole source vendor. May be applied to initial and
replenishment spares, material and support equipment, and
service contracts for maintenance and support of weapon
systems. [Ref. 3:p. 2]
• Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRL) . A list of data
requirements that are authorized for a specific acquisi-
tion and made a part of the contract. [Ref. l:p. 15-4]
• Design Control Activity. A contractor or Government
activity having responsibility for the design of a given
part and for the preparation and currency of engineering
drawings and other technical data for that part. [Ref.
l:p. 15-5]
• Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) . The quantity of material
for which annual order costs and annual holding costs are
balanced to minimize total variable cost. [Ref. 10 :p. 1]
• End Item. For the purposes of this paper, an assembly or
component produced for installation either into a weapon
system in production or into a higher assembly intended
for eventual installation to a weapon system in produc-
tion.
• Initial Operational Capability. The first attainment of
the capability to employ effectively a weapon, item of
equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics,
and which is manned or operated by a trained, equipped,
and supported military unit or force. [Ref . l:p. 15-7]
• Lead time. The time form the date or order to receipt of
the spare in inventory including administrative time
required to place the order with a supplier, production
time for the supplier to produce the part, and delivery
time required to get the part to a stock point. [Ref.
ll:p. 62]
• Learning Curve. An empirical relationship between the
number of units produced and the number of labor hours
required to produce them (sometimes call an improvement
curve). [Ref. 12:p. 267]
• Logistics Support Analysis. The selective application of
scientific and engineering efforts undertaken during the
acquisition process, as part of the systems engineering
process, to assist in: causing support considerations to
influence design; defining support requirements that are
related optimally to design and to each other; acquiring
the required support; and providing the required support
during the operational phase at minimum cost. [Ref. l:p.
15-9]
• Prime Contractor. A contractor having responsibility for
design control and delivery of a system or equipment such
as aircraft, engines, ships, tanks, vehicles, guns and
missiles, ground communications and electronic systems,
ground support equipment, and test equipment. [Ref. l:p.
15-14]
• Provisioned Item Order (PIO) . A Government procured
initial spares order placed with a contractor against the
list of initial provisioning spares called for in the
production contract. These orders are placed within the
time frames specified in the Supply Support Management
Plan (SSMP) . [Ref. 13:p. 4, Ref. 14:p. 2]
• Provisioning. The management process of determining and
acquiring the range and quantity of support items neces-
sary to operate and maintain an end item of material for
an initial period of service. [Ref. 15 :p. 2-1]
• Repair Parts. Consumable bits and pieces; that is,
individual parts or nonrepairable assemblies, required for
the repair of spare parts or major end items. [Ref. l:p.
15-15]
• Replenishment. Spares procurement to restock supply-
system inventories depleted by the consumption of spares
as a result of operations and maintenance actions. [Ref.
2:p. 158]
• Safety Level . A level of supply system stock required to
compensate for unexpected demands, repair and recycle
times, pipeline, procurement lead time, and unforseen
delays. [Ref. 11 :p. 61]
• Spare Parts. Repairable components or assemblies used for
maintenance replacement purposes in major end items of
equipment 1 . [Ref. l:p. 15-16]
• Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) . A
procedure used to combine procurement of selected spares
with procurement of identical items produced for installa-
tion on the primary system, subsystem, or equipment. [Ref.
l:p. 15-16]
• Spares. A term used to denote both spare parts and repair
parts. [Ref. l:p. 15-16]
• Supply Support Management Plan (SSMP) . The primary
planning document which lists the major supply support
milestones and events for a weapon system or equipment
acquisition or configuration change, with projected and
actual delivery dates for each event, stated in a chrono-
logical sequence, commencing with the proposed budget and
culminating with the attainment of the projected Material
Support Date (MSD)
.
"DOD Instruction 5000.2 distinguishes between the terms
spares, spare parts, and repair parts, but most writers tend to use
the terms synonymously. To avoid confusion in this paper, the
terms repairable spares and consumable spares will be used to




Chapter II of this thesis discusses the literature review
and the theory behind the SAIP concept. A brief outline of
the DoD spare parts procurement environment is provided. Then,
theories behind SAIP, its history, and current regulations are
examined. Finally, the presumed benefits and risks of SAIP
are discussed along with implementation variations and other
issues
.
Chapter III provides background information on the
implementation of SAIP within the Naval aviation logistics
community. Factors driving the current ASO and NAVAIR
interest in SAIP and the efficacy of the process to date are
discussed. Following those discussions, current issues
leading to the questions addressed by this study are present-
ed.
Chapter IV discusses the approach taken in conducting the
research to answer the primary and subsidiary questions posed
by this thesis. Survey structure, responses, and demographic
data are also presented.
Chapter V is the analysis of data collected during the
research effort. Various alternatives for implementing SAIP
within Naval aviation logistics are presented and discussed.
Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations for
implementing the SAIP technique within the Naval aviation
logistics community.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SAIP THEORY
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, most literature on spares acquisition has
dealt with the implications of the 80s horror stories,
increasing competition, and the Breakout process. Little
literature has been generated specifically on SAIP. Addition-
ally, most of the literature found on SAIP dates from the
early 80s, when SAIP appeared to be a topic of higher interest
than it has been of late. None the less, much of what was
said about SAIP in the early 80s remains valid today and is
useful in examining the SAIP process and understanding the
issues involved with its implementation. Particularly useful,
is a study conducted by Brenda J. Allen and John B. Abeil in
1983, titled, "An Evaluation of Spare Acquisition Integrated
with Production. " Their study thoroughly examined many
aspects of the SAIP technique in general and its application
to specific Air Force programs. The findings and conclusions
drawn by Allen and Abeil provide the foundation for the SAIP
theory underlying this thesis and are, therefore, recapped
below. Other sources referenced below serve to augment and
update Allen and Abeil' s effort.
The following paragraphs will acquaint the reader with the
DoD spare parts acquisition environment in general and will
12
then define and discuss the SAIP process, its history,
presumed benefits and risks, and general issues regarding its
use.
B. THE DoD SPARE PARTS ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
1. Introduction
There are two distinct categories of spares within
DoD: initial or provisioned spares and replenishment spares.
Provisioned spares are acquired as part of the weapon system
contract to support new weapons systems or subsystems during
the introductory stage of the system life cycle before
significant usage (demand) data has been gathered. Replenish-
ment spares, on the other hand, are acquired on later con-
tracts or orders after some demand history has been gathered.
The processes used to determine purchase quantities and the
acquisition methods for the two categories, therefore, are
also distinctly different.
2 . Provisioned Spares
Initial spares to support a system are selected
through a process known as provisioning. Throughout the early
phases of system development, logistic support analyses (LSA)
are conducted to determine system reliability and maintain-
ability factors and aid in the identification and provisioning
of logistics support elements [Ref. 11 :p 14].
Contractor and Government engineers and logistics
experts review system design and make estimates of such
13
factors as expected Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) , Mean
Time To Repair (MTTR) , and appropriate repair level. The
information developed as a result of the LSA provides crucial
input for the provisioning process.
During the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EScMD) phase of the system life cycle, the Government issues
a Provisioning Requirements Document to the contractor. This
E&MD contractual document notifies the contractor of provi-
sioning technical documentation requirements, i.e., the list
of parts the contractor will recommend as spares to support
the system during the demand development period and the format
for the list. Contractor recommendations are based on the
technical parameters developed as a result of the LSA. The
recommended list is provided in the form of a Logistics
Support Analysis Record (LSAR) . A DoD provisioning team,
representing the Program Office, end users, and the inventory
control point (ICP) , meets with the contractor in an item
selection conference to finalize the list. DoD requires the
final list to " . . .be based on clearly defined weapon system or
end item readiness objectives." [Ref. 15:p. 1] In order to
meet this requirement, the provisioning team relies on
readiness based sparing models (RBS) that compute stock levels
required to achieve a specified operational availability [Ref.
16 :p. 4] . End item production contracts are prepared with a
provisioned item order (PIO) line item that provides for
placing provisioned item orders against the contract at a
14
later time. Frequently, provisioning conferences are not held
until after award of the first production contract [Ref . 2:p.
21] .
After the provisioning lists are finalized and
national stock numbers (NSNs) are assigned to the selected
items, PIOs for spares are placed against the production
contract. The idea is to place these orders production lead
time away from the date the Government is supposed to be able
to support the new system [Ref. 2:p. 161] . This date is known
at the Material Support Date (MSD) . In order to expedite
production of the spares, these PIOs are usually unpriced.
This approach allows the contractor to start producing the
parts immediately, thereby making sure they are available to
support the scheduled initial operational capability (IOC)
date. While the spares are being produced, a detailed price
proposal is developed. The contractor submits the proposal to
the Government, and negotiations ensue to determine a fair and
reasonable price. When the Government and the contractor come
to an agreement on the price the contract is modified to
reflect the agreement. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
It is important to note that, despite the best,
conscientious efforts of the LSA team and application of
complex quantitative methods to determine reliability and
maintainability factors, decisions made during the provi-
sioning process are, for the most part, based on estimates and
unstable designs which are subject to change with operational
15
experience. The earlier in the acquisition process provi-
sioning spares are obtained, the greater the danger of having
incorrect quantities or configurations in stock. Figure 1,
from an OFPP study on DoD spare parts procurement, illustrates
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Figure 1 Basic Provisioning Process [Ref. 2:p.i 55]
3 . Replenishment Spares
As the name implies, replenishment spares are spares
that are used to restock the supply system as existing stocks
(originally laid in as provisioning spares) are consumed by
operational units. An inventory control point and an invento-
ry manager (or item manager) are assigned to manage each type
of replenishment part. There are 17 inventory control points
within DoD [Ref. 4:p. 1] . Figure 2, taken from the same OFPP
study as Figure 1, illustrates a basic replenishment process.
16
During the early part of a weapon system's life cycle,
replenishment spares are often procured similarly to provi-
Procurement
Solicit






Figure 2 Basic Replenishment Process [Ref. 3:P . 159)
sioning spares; using unpriced PIOs . This situation arises
because -the estimates made during provisioning conferences
prove to be inaccurate as systems fail to perform to specifi-
cations, and rapid action must be taken to replace depleted
provisioned spares [Ref. 14:p. 2]. As more reliable demand
data is developed, though, the replenishment process becomes
more automated.
DoD ICPs generally use a continuous review and reorder
point system to manage spares. On hand inventory levels are
continuously reviewed, and replenishment orders are placed
when stocks are depleted to a reorder point . The reorder
point is based on a specified lead time for acquiring the
17
replenishment spares and a safety level . Automated systems
alert the item manager that stocks have reached the reorder
point and also determine the order quantity. Order quantities
(alternatively called operating levels or cycle requirements)
provide sufficient material to satisfy normal usage between
replenishment acquisitions.
The order quantity is based on EOQ models. Theoreti-
cally, these models take into account economic tradeoffs
between the cost to order the material and the cost of holding
inventory, as well as unit price and system demand, in order
to determine economic order quantities that minimize total
variable costs. According to Perry [Ref. 10:p. 1], these
models rely on several assumptions:
• That order cost and handling cost parameters are accurate.
• That- material ordered is received in one delivery or at a
constant rate over the procurement lead time.
• That administrative lead time is reasonable and does not
unduly impact other inventory costs or parameters such as
safety level
.
• That the price paid is not a function of the quantity
ordered.
• That the demand parameter is accurate and steady.
Perry goes on to point out that these assumptions are often
incorrect. Administrative lead time may indeed affect the
order cost. The relationship between quantity ordered and
price may be very strong and should therefore be recognized in
the process, though it is difficult to determine exactly what
18
the relationship will be until after the acquisition is
negotiated. Finally, demand often varies considerably. [Ref
.
10:p. 2]
The variable and sometimes inaccurate nature of the
parameters relied upon in both the provisioning and replenish-
ment processes contributes to what is often a "hectic"
atmosphere in the spares replenishment business. Facing
greater demand than originally anticipated, contracting
officers often operate in a "fire fighting" atmosphere in
which "...esoteric considerations like component Breakout,
dual sourcing, competition, and socioeconomic considerations
are less important than keeping up with the constant stream of
incoming purchase requests for more spare parts." [Ref. 14:p.
3]
In order to expedite replenishment and reduce the workload
associated with processing procurement requests, ICPs routine-
ly establish basic ordering agreements (BOAs) with parts
suppliers. These suppliers may be either the system prime
contractor or the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) /design
control activity (DCA) that produced and supplied the part
used by the prime for production installations. Priced or
unpriced orders may be placed against these BOAs depending on
the urgency of the requirement. Unpriced orders are handled
in the same manner as the provisioned orders discussed earlier.
The process of buying spares from a DCA rather than
the prime contractor is known as Breakout . As discussed in
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the introduction to this study, Breakout has been the primary-
method of obtaining competition and savings in the spares
acquisition process since the Secretary of Defense issued the
Defense Spare Parts Initiatives in 1983. There has been
continued pressure since that time for Government buying
offices to pursue Breakout savings. The Defense Procurement
Reform Act of 19 84 required contractors furnishing spare parts
to the Government to identify the actual manufacturers or
items to facilitate the Breakout process and as late as 1990
the DoD Office of the Inspector General was auditing service
progress in implementing Breakout. [Ref. 4:p. 2] Though
increased competition and Breakout were the key elements of
the Secretary's initiatives and the Procurement Reform Act,
they were not the only initiatives considered by the services
to improve the process. As noted earlier, encouraging the
procurement of spares concurrent with the production of end
item was a key initiative in the Navy's BOSS program [Ref.
3:p. 2]
.
C. Spares Acquisition Integrated With Production (SAIP)
1. Introduction to SAIP
The procurement of spares concurrent with end item
production is usually referred to as Spares Acquisition
Integrated with Production (SAIP) . References to SAIP are
sparse in current DoD acquisition directives --so sparse, in
fact, that they are easily quoted in their entirety here. The
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Defense Acquisition Regulations Supplement makes the following
points in regard to SAIP:
(a) Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP)
is a technique used to acquire replenishment parts
concurrently with parts being produced for the end item.
(b) DoD acquisition managers select parts for SAIP under
the criteria in DoDI 4245.12, Spares Acquisition Integrat-
ed with Production (SAIP)
(c) Include appropriately tailored provisions in the
contract when SAIP is used. [Ref. 17 :p. 217.7502]
DoD Instruction 4245.12, referenced in the DFARS quote above
was canceled by DoD Instruction 5000.2 which, with respect to
SAIP, says only:
Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production . When
determined to be cost-effective, procurement of selected
spares may be combined with procurement of identical items
being procured for deployment.
(1) Spares acquisition integrated with production may be
used to procure spares from either the prime con-
tractor or a subcontractor who is the design control
activity.
(2) Spares acquisition integrated with production
requirements will be specified in the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan. [Ref. l:p. 7-A-4]
There is obviously very little guidance offered by
these two sources for the program manager or contracting
officer considering the SAIP technique. Previous DoD guid-
ance, though far from exhaustive, provided considerably more
information on the topic. The fact that there is so little
guidance at this point may reflect a DoD attempt to avoid
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limiting the prerogatives of program managers and contracting
officers. None the less, the information provided in the
canceled DoD SAIP instruction is still useful for gaining an
understanding of the theory behind SAIP and, what used to be
considered, appropriate circumstances for its use.
SAIP is believed to result in savings because combin-
ing a spares acquisition with a production contract takes
advantage of economies of scale that occur when contractors
(primes or subs) place larger orders with their vendors.
Placing larger orders results in lower material costs as
overhead and general and administrative (G&A) burdens are
distributed over a larger production lot thereby lowering unit
cost. Additionally, consolidating orders avoids redundant
setup costs, loss in learning, and redundant costs for both
the Government and contractor associated with negotiating and
administering multiple contracts (if SAIP requirements are
included in the production contract)
.
DoD Instruction 4245.12 summarized the rationale
behind the SAIP concept in stating that, "SAIP minimizes the
cost of spares by avoiding the charges normally associated
with separate material orders and manufacturing options."
[Ref. 18 :p. 1] The instruction also mandated that "DoD
acquisition managers . . . consider the use of SAIP for the
acquisition of spares when the end item is, or will be, in
production." [Ref. 18:p. 1] It was suggested that the SAIP
technique should be applied to:
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• Spares associated with the production of, or major
modifications to, end items.
• Initial spares requirements.
• Replenishment spares requirements.
• Foreign military sales requirements.
• War reserve requirements. [Ref. 18 :p. 2]
It was also suggested that the technique would be appropriate
whenever the following criteria were met:
• When economies of scale will substantially exceed the
additional administrative cost of implementing the SAIP
technique.
• When sufficient quantities of the item in question are not
available within the required period through normal supply
channels.
• When the risk of obsolescence is manageable. [Ref. 18 :p.
2]
If, after weighing all these factors, SAIP was considered
appropriate for a particular acquisition, it was considered
preferable to include a SAIP line item in the production RFP
because such a practice would involve an early commitment to
the SAIP strategy while the acquisition was still in a
competitive mode. It would also allow competing offerors to
use the additional SAIP requirement as leverage with subcon-
tractors, enhancing the potential for combining spares orders
with orders for identical production line items. [Ref. 18 :p.
2] Much of this direction was undoubtedly based on early
Government experiences with SAIP.
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2. History of SAIP
The procurement scandals of the late 70s and early 80s
elicited renewed interest in SAIP along with other techniques
for promoting greater efficiency in the procurement process,
but the concept did not originate in 1983. The first Govern-
ment forays into the SAIP process were made in the early 70s.
These efforts illustrate many of the issues surrounding SAIP,
so they are briefly recapped in the following paragraphs.
The McDonnell Aircraft Company (McAir) originated the
SAIP idea in 1974, offering it to the Air Force for use on the
F-15 program [Ref. 5:p. 2-6]. In the F-15 program, three
approaches to the SAIP technique were exercised. In the first
McAir exercised vendor options to purchase extra production
installation radar shipsets which were then sold to the F-15
program office to be used as provisioned spares. In the
second approach, the program office again purchased complete
shipsets from McAir, but those shipsets were for replenishment
spares. In the third approach, the program office consoli-
dated spares replenishment procurement requests from item
managers (not shipsets) with production requirements and
placed one order with McAir. [Ref. 5:p. 2-7]
These SAIP efforts differed from the normal spares
contracting process in several respects. Savings under the
first two approaches were questioned by the Defense audit
service in 1979. Although a significant savings could be
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shown in the combined purchase of shipsets for production and
spares, the spares requirement was not for shipsets but for
LRUs and SRUs 2 . Buying shipsets resulted in buying greater
quantities of some of these parts than sparing models called
for. [Ref. 5:p. 2-9] SAIP also affected the timing of the
Government procurement actions in all cases. The Air Force
was obliged to buy their spares to meet vendor production
windows rather than purchasing them lead time away from the
expected date they would be required for use. Finally, the
ICPs relinquished their responsibility for spares contracting
to the program office.
The second Air Force application of the technique was
on the F-16 program. This application was different in that
the Government initiated the SAIP requirement instead of being
offered it by the contractor. Additionally, the decision to
use SAIP was made after the production contract had already
been awarded to General Dynamics. SAIP, therefore, was
included in a separate spares contract linked to the produc-
tion contract through various clauses and amendments. [Ref.
5:p. 2-15]
General Dynamics, the prime contractor, had already
awarded contracts to its vendors and suppliers for production
parts. These were fixed price contracts for three years worth
2The terms LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) and SRU (Shop Replace-
able Unit) are synonymous with WRA: Weapons Replaceable Assembly
and SRA (Shop Replaceable Assembly)
.
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of production, and none of them included SAIP provisions. The
Air Force approach to "SAIP" in this case was to direct
General Dynamics to exercise the production quantity options
written into its contracts with vendors. These additional
quantities would then be delivered to the Government as spares
in the identical configuration and at the same price as
production items. [Ref. 5:p. 2-16]
Thirty percent of the vendors declined to participate
in the SAIP effort. The rationale they provided for declining
to participate is enlightening with respect to vendor's
approaches to pricing spares, and is therefore quoted directly
from Allen and Abeil's [Ref. 5:p. 2-17] study of SAIP:
• Spares prices are computed differently from those for
production installation items.
• The market conditions upon which prices for production
installation items were based had changed considerably
since the production options were negotiated.
• Prices for production installation items are traditionally
substantially below normal selling prices as they are
developed competitively and they are directly influenced
by potential spares sales which are offered at full
selling prices, including a nominal profit.
• Spares prices are based on actual cost visibility at the
time the order is placed.
• Offering spares at the same prices as production installa-
tion items increases the inherent risk, exposure to which
for such a long period of time might prove not to be in
the firm's best interests.
Allen and Abeil assert that these responses are evidence of a
"buy- in" phenomenon. That may be the case, though only the
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third explanation above provides unambiguous evidence of buy-
in. One could also surmise that the vendors were simply not
interested in providing an additional service or product to
the Government that their fixed price contracts with General
Dynamics did not require them to provide. Why not negotiate
a new contract for the spares requirement and see how well
they could do?
The F-16 experience illustrated the problems likely to
be encountered if a SAIP procurement is not addressed early in
the production procurement process. Trying to "add-on" the
SAIP requirement after production contracts have already been
awarded is apt to meet with resistance or rejection from
contractors. Both the F-15 and F-16 SAIP efforts provide a
good background for considering the benefits and risks of the
SAIP technique and other issues pertinent to its application.
[Ref. 5:p. 2-15]
3 . Benefits of SAIP
Benefits attributed by existing literature to the SAIP
technique include lower prices, greater visibility of prices,
reduced administrative burden, better configuration control,
and enhanced readiness.
a. Lower Prices
A generally accepted factor for price savings
generated by use of the SAIP technique has been fifteen
percent [Ref. 5:p. 3-12] . There are a number of difficulties
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with attempting to quantify SAIP savings which are discussed
later in this study. None the less, there are common sense
reasons to believe SAIP savings may be substantial. As
discussed above, the economies of scale discussed previously
are one factor in SAIP savings. Manufacturers are able to
purchase materials in larger lots which usually leads to price
breaks and, therefore, lower direct material costs. Addition-
ally, overhead and G&A expenses are spread over a larger lot
sizes, thus lowering unit price. Consolidating spares and
production contracts also avoids redundant manufacturing set-
up costs which may be the greatest factor in cost differences
between spares and production installs [Ref. 5:p. 3-13].
Finally, combining spares and production requirements allows
manufacturers to stay on the same learning curve, thus
avoiding the phenomenon of learning loss
.
Perry's study on the of production lots, though not
dealing specifically with SAIP, lends credence to the 15
percent factor. In this study 800 stocked items from 11
different ICPs were analyzed to determine, among other things,
the relevance and impact of quantity discounts on buy quanti-
ties. An analysis of several hundred contract folders
revealed "...numerous instances where the procurement of
larger quantities than originally solicited yielded unit price
reductions of 10 to 20 percent." [Ref. 10 :p. 3]
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b. Greater Visibility of Prices
Combining spares and production requirements on the
same order allows contract administrators and Government
auditors to easily compare the pricing methodology for both
spares and production items to ensure consistency. In a non-
SAIP process spares and production items are procured with
separate contracts, so it may be difficult to ascertain
whether consistent pricing methods were followed in each case.
Greater visibility of the consolidated order presumably
provides greater confidence that prices are fair and reason-
able.
c. Reduced Administrative Burden
Reduced administrative burdens are believed to
result if SAIP requirements are included on the same contract
as production items (they do not necessarily have to be) .
Preparing one RFP, one proposal, negotiating, awarding, and
administering one contract should be less burdensome, or time
consuming, for both the contractor and the Government than
contracting separately for spares and installation units.
d. Better Configuration Control
Keeping spares in the appropriate configuration to
support production items can be difficult. Weapon systems are
particularly susceptible to design changes early in the
production and deployment phase of the life cycle with the
result that deployed systems may have several different
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configurations of the same part installed. Provisioning of
spares in the appropriate configuration and quantity to
support these design changes requires careful coordination of
the contracting effort and good visibility of evolving
designs. Design changes can result in the hectic atmosphere
alluded to in Chapter I, as contracting officers rush through
repetitive contract actions on short notice to provide
appropriately configured spares to the field.
Theoretically, SAIP can avoid this problem and
ensure greater compatibility of spares and production end
items, with less effort, if contract clauses are appropriately
tailored tasking the design control activity to produce spares
in an appropriate ratio to evolving production designs. [Ref
.
5:p. 3-19, Ref. 19:p. 2]
e. Enhanced Readiness
It has been held that SAIP can enhance readiness by
helping to ensure timely delivery of spares. This theory-
depends on awarding the contract containing SAIP to the prime.
Presumably, the prime is very sensitive to scarcity of
materials and other vendor concerns since profit depends on
meeting the production schedule. In addition, the prime's
production requirements are apt to represent a larger volume
of the subcontractor's business than the Government's spares
requirements. Therefore the prime is motivated to work with
the subcontractor to ensure timely delivery of parts and has
30
greater leverage with the subcontractor than the Government
would with a separate spares contract.
4. Risks of SAIP
There are a number of potential risks associated with
SAIP. Some result from ordering spares earlier in the system
life cycle than would normally be the case and others from
increased costs that the process can generate. The most
notable risks mentioned in the literature include obsoles-
cence, over procurement, and availability of funding.
a. Obsolescence
Because employing the SAIP technique may involve
ordering spares earlier in the provisioning process than
normal, there is a risk spares may become obsolete as a result
of design changes to the still evolving system. A phased
ordering approach along with configuration control clauses in
the contract that call for prorating deliveries of spares with
changing system designs is offered as a method for controlling
this type of risk. [Ref. 19 :p. 1]
Jb. Over procurement
The risk of over procurement is again related to
ordering spares before designs have stabilized and, more
importantly, before sufficient demand data has been gathered
to determine appropriate stock levels. A phased ordering
approach may or may not counter this type of risk [Ref. 5:p.
3-9] . Basing a procurement on insufficient demand history may
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result in having simply having more of a particular part than
is necessary, even if the design is not obsolete. Unit price
savings may be irrelevant if there is an over investment in
total stock.
c. Availability of funding
In order to obtain true SAIP savings, i.e., combin-
ing spares requirements in some way with the prime contrac-
tor's production orders to achieve larger vendor production
lots and economies of scale, spares may have to be placed on
order when the contractor is ordering long lead items
.
However funding may not be authorized for long lead spares.
A contractor who undertakes to order material based on
Government assurances that a spares order will be forthcoming
incurs a substantial risk that funds will in fact not be made
available.
5. Other SAIP Issues
a. Prime Contractor vs Subcontractor
Presumably, SAIP arrangements may be entered into
with either the prime contractor or a subcontractor or vendor.
Both approaches would appear to have benefits and costs.
Entering into a SAIP arrangement with a prime contractor can
place the responsibility for ensuring proper configuration of
the spares on that prime and may result in enhanced readiness
as discussed above. However, such an approach will also
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result in the prime adding his administrative costs and profit
to the price of the spares. On the other hand, contracting to
buy spares from a subcontractor or vendor concurrently with
their production of end items for the prime will probably
result in lower cost, but may entail a loss of configuration
control. A contracting officer might have to consider which
of these two "drivers," configuration control or cost, is of
ultimate importance and decide accordingly. [Ref. 5:p. 5-2]
Jb . Timing
Coordination and timing of the spares purchase with
procurement of the end item is obviously critical to the
success of the SAIP effort. Spares purchases must coincide
with "hot" production lines if any benefits are to be realized
[Ref. 5:p. 5-1]. But, as discussed above, different offices
or commands may be responsible for the production and spares
contracting responsibilities, and their requirements may not
coincide. This issue would not appear to be as critical in
the initial introduction of a new system when initial spares
are being procured to support that introduction, but the same
cannot be said for spares replenishment requirements.
The decision to buy replenishment spares is
generally based on computer based continuous reorder review
systems that consider on hand quantities, demand history and
existing orders to recommend a reorder quantity [Ref. 10 :p.
1] . These reorder recommendations will not be based on
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pending production contracts. Should item managers then
investigate to see if production contracts are pending?
Should they accelerate or postpone their procurement requests
to coincide with production contracts? Additionally, funding
for spares may come from different sources than end item
production funds, and the two sources of funds may not be
available at the same time. Though critical to successful
implementation of the SAIP technique, coordination and timing
in an environment typified by separate contracting commands
with different missions, goals, and priorities would appear
difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
c. Variations of the Technique
The SAIP technique is primarily a means of consoli-
dating orders to achieve economies of scale. It would not
seem to demand a specific contract type or methodology. Any
number of approaches may be taken to implementing the tech-
nique. Some, or all of the benefits of the technique could
conceivably be obtained by:
• Combining all requirements on one Government contract
with the prime contractor.
• Negotiating separate spares and end item production
contracts concurrently with the prime contractor.
• Negotiating a separate spares contract with a subcon-
tractor concurrently with the sub's production of end
items for a prime contractor.
• Negotiating a spares contract with a prime or sub
concurrently with some other customer's spares
contracts.
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The approach to implementing the technique is limited only by
the imagination of the contracting official and applicable
laws and regulations governing Federal contracting (which, as
already pointed out, are sparse on the topic of SAIP)
.
d. Provisioning Versus Replenishment
One of the key issues regarding SAIP is whether it
is appropriate to use the technique for replenishment require-
ments or if it should be restricted to initial provisioning
requirements . The DFARS expressly states that SAIP is a
technique "... used to acquire replenishment parts concurrent-
ly with parts being produced for the end item." [Ref. I7:p.
217] It is not clear from the brief reference to SAIP in the
DFARS whether "replenishment" in this case was to be inter-
preted in the strict sense discussed above, or whether it was
an imprecise use of the term intended to encompass the
universe of initial provisioning and replenishment spares.
However, the canceled DoD SAIP instruction was clear on this
subject, stating that SAIP was appropriate to use for both
types of spares procurement [Ref. 18:p. 1]
.
Allen and Abeil, however, point out the difficul-
ties that can be encountered in attempting to apply SAIP to
replenishment requirements. The issues of distinctly separate
contracting commands for production items and spares, coordi-
nation and timing issues, and funding issues may all thwart
attempts to implement SAIP on any procurement actions other
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than initial requirements included in production contracts for
new end items [Ref . 5:p. 5-3]
.
Production contracts and contractor production
schedules are generally managed on an annual basis. Contrac-
tors also plan their procurement of production materials on an
annual basis to support the production schedules. SAIP
procurement must be timed to coincide with the production
schedule, and preferably, with the contractor's procurement
order release date so the contractor can achieve economies of
scale in his purchases and pass the savings on to the Govern-
ment. Replenishment spares purchases, on the other hand, are
not planned on an annual basis. Procurement requests are
instead generated when computer reviews reveal that a given
stock item has been depleted down to it's reorder point.
Given the different procurement environments for initial
spares and replenishment spares, it is reasonable to question
whether attempts should be made to apply SAIP to replenishment
requirements
.
e. Selection of SAIP Candidates
It was noted in Chapter I that DoD manages approxi-
mately 4 million spares. Should all of these parts be
considered for application of the SAIP technique. Considering
the difficulties that may be encountered in implementing the
technique, it seems clear that such an approach would not be
cost effective and that SAIP should be limited to a smaller
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universe. As with other SAIP issues, there is no existing
guidance in this area, so the decision on what criteria should
qualify a given spare as a SAIP candidate is left to weapons
managers
.
f. SAIP Versus Competition and Breakout
SAIP is a cost saving measure, as are competition
and Breakout. Competition and Breakout requirements are
codified and regulated -- SAIP is not. It is appropriate,
therefore, to question whether SAIP might conflict with these
other contracting imperatives. Will implementation of the
SAIP technique preclude competition or can it be implemented
in a competitive acquisition environment? Allen and Abeil's
study suggested that SAIP was best implemented through the
prime contractor [Ref . 5:p. 5-3] . Does this mean then that it
should not be used when spares are being broken out? If there
is a conflict, must the codified and regulated imperatives
take precedence over SAIP?
g. Determining SAIP Savings.
It is held to be common sense that SAIP will
generate savings as a result of economies of scale. Can this
theorem be verified with quantifiable data? How can a
contracting officer be sure that significant savings have been
obtained. This is a crucial question, especially if a SAIP
methodology is followed in lieu of competition or Breakout.
It is also important in deciding on selection criteria for
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application of the SAIP technique. At what price level will
SAIP savings be significant enough to justify the considerable
time and effort involved in coordinating a SAIP acquisition?
D. SUMMARY OF SAIP THEORY
The paragraphs in this chapter have outlined the DoD
spares acquisition environment and provided a solid foundation
in the theoretical aspects of the SAIP technique and issues
that must be considered in implementing it. SAIP has histori-
cally been difficult to implement and it is likely that this
fact has thwarted its implementation. However, the fiscal
realities of the post cold war era have forced the services to
investigate new and innovative ways to save money. They have
also been forced to revisit old ways of doing business that
may not have been used to their full potential. This is the
case with SAIP. The Naval aviation community is dusting off
the SAIP technique and investigating its applicability to the
new acquisition environment. The circumstances motivating
this new interest in SAIP and this research effort are
addressed in the following chapter.
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III. SAIP AND NAVAL AVIATION LOGISTICS BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Efforts have been on going over the last several decades
to improve management within the Department of Defense.
Various studies, commissions, and legislation have been
undertaken to that end. One of the most recent, and certainly
the one with the greatest impact, was the President's Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, usually referred to
as the "Packard Commission" (after the chairman, David
Packard) . The commission was established by President Reagan
in 1985 to:
study defense management policies and procedures,
including the budget process, the procurement system,
legislative oversight and the organizational and opera-
tional arrangements, both formal and informal, among the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified
Commands system, the Military departments, and the
Congress. [Ref. 20 :p. 1]
The Packard Commission completed its work and reported to the
President in 19 86, making a number of recommendations to
improve DoD operations.
During the years since the Commissions report, many of its
recommendations have been successfully implemented. However,
in 1989, President Bush directed the Secretary of Defense to
develop a plan to fully implement the initiatives and to
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"...realize substantial improvements ... in defense management
overall." [Ref. 21 :p. 1] Secretary Cheney's efforts reported
the results of the Department's efforts in the Defense
Management Report (DMR) , outlining actions needed to improve
DoD. The services recommended a number of initiatives that
could be taken to achieve the improvements called for by the
DMR. The service offered initiatives were reviewed by OSD,
modified and adjusted where necessary, and signed by the
Secretary of Defense as Defense Management Report Decisions
(DMRD) . Together, the initiatives have been estimated to have
the potential for eliminating 42,900 civilian and military
positions and saving $39 billion over fiscal years 1991-95
[Ref. 22:p. 1] . One decision is of particular importance to
this study -- DMRD 901: "Reducing Supply Management Costs."
DMRD 901 calls for several actions in supply management
that are projected to save $10.1 billion:
• Moving operational costs into stock fund accounts.
• Change inventory stockage policies to reduce transporta-
tion costs.
• Increase the use of commercial items.
• Increase the use of multiple year contracts.
• Permit DoD to fund technical data within stock fund
accounts. [Ref. 22 :p. 2]
Each of the services have been challenged to achieve some
portion of the DMRD 9 01 total savings, and of course each
major supply command within the services must attain some
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smaller portion of the savings. The Navy Aviation Supply-
Office's DMRD 901 "challenge" is to save a total of $1.8
billion over the five period from 1991 to 1995 [Ref . 23]
.
Achieving $1.8 billion in savings over five years is a
daunting task. ASO's plan calls for saving $800 million by
pursuing alternative spares solutions 3
,
$506 million by
reducing inventory levels, and $537 million by pursuing new
contractual methods. The new contractual methods envisioned
by ASO include more competition, long term contracting and
SAIP. [Ref. 23]
That SAIP is a key part of ASO's strategy to meet its
savings challenge is evident from the frequent mention of the
technique in any ASO discussion of the current or future
contracting environment. The savings figures noted above were
extracted from a brief given by the ASO Commander to the
National Contract Management Association (NCMA) in February of
1992 [Ref. 23]. The topic was again brought up by the
Commander during the 1992 "Day With Industry" symposium at
ASO. During this briefing, a list of potential SAIP savings
on specific systems was presented that totaled approximately
$17.7 million [Ref. 24] . The most concrete evidence of ASO's
commitment to the SAIP technique is in the ASO Acquisition
3
"Alternative Spares Solutions" is an approach to providing
spares support which embodies reliability improvements, alternative
ILS solutions, and repair of consumables. A detailed description
is beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers may wish to
inquire into ASO's BOSS II program (Best Overall Support Solution)
.
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Strategy for 1992-1996. In discussing responsibilities of the
ASO Acquisition Executive under Strategy One, "ASO Framework
for Acquisition Planning, " the Acquisition Executive is called
upon to exercise leadership as the overall integrator of
acquisition- centered efforts in ASO. The office is to coordi-
nate performance of planning and act as the focal point for
integrating actions required to implement acquisition plans.
Such plans are to cover among other things
:
Opportunities for cost effective/value-based procurement,
such as: buys in conjunction with other commands or with
planned suppliers' production runs; multiple item con-
tracting; multiple year procurements; use of vendors'
pricing arrangements; and, procurement of long lead time
material. [Ref. 25:p. 10]
It is obvious from these recurring references to the SAIP
technique, that ASO believes SAIP has the potential to achieve
substantial savings if it can be effectively implemented.
Effective implementation appears to be the problem. This
statement does not mean that SAIP has been ineffective when it
has been applied, but that applying the technique systemati-
cally across a broad range of procurement actions appears to
have been particularly difficult. For instance, discussions
with the ASO Acquisition Executive's Office revealed that, in
the past, out of nine major spares procurements from the
Lockheed Corporation with SAIP potential, they "missed the
boat or window" on seven of them [Ref. 26] . The general
feeling at ASO was that, although the command was supportive
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of SAIP and encouraged Weapons Managers to explore SAIP
potential, actually closing on SAIP opportunities continued to
be an elusive goal. They "missed the window" continuously --
i.e., they failed either to learn of SAIP windows or to
generate procurement actions in time to meet the windows.
To counter this situation, ASO has stressed the importance
of considering SAIP early in the acquisition planning process.
"Who else is buying this? When are they buying it? Can we
pull it out of the machine and really look at our require-
ments?" [Ref. 26] Additionally, the Acquisition Executive's
office has sought to improve communication and coordination
with the NAVAIR, in an attempt to obtain more timely and
consistent information regarding production contract actions
and SAIP opportunities. Despite these efforts, the expressed
feelings of individuals contacted at both NAVAIR and ASO was
that more could and should be done to expand application of
the SAIP technique in Naval aviation spares procurement. One
of the research respondents succinctly summarized the current
SAIP dilemma facing ASO when he said:
I would guess that we miss SAIP opportunities routinely.
The concept of SAIP is common sense; however, the concept
needs to be re- engineered into a common sense approach for
identification and execution of requirements. Unless it
is "easy, " [weapon systems managers] will not routinely
check the SAIP opportunity. SAIP usually depends on the
motivation of the IM [item manager] . [Ref. 27 :p. 1]
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B. ISSUES
Based on the background study, the question of more
extensive application of the SAIP technique raises a couple of
questions: Considering the difficulty of implementing SAIP, is
it worth the effort, and, if so, are there easier ways to
implement SAIP to encourage more extensive application of the
technique? These questions are the basis for the formal
research questions posed in Chapter I of this paper. The
approach taken to answering these questions and the informa-
tion obtained from that approach is discussed in the following
chapter.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. METHODOLOGY
1. Introduction
The research methodology was designed to provide a
systematic approach to uncovering the theory and background of
the SAIP concept, determining the issues involved, drafting
appropriate research questions, and then tapping appropriate
sources to obtain information for constructing answers to the
questions. The research was conducted in three distinct
phases
:
• Literature review and initial contacts.
• Mail surveys
.
• On-site research at NAVAIR, the Naval Supply Systems
Command, and ASO.
2 . Literature Review and Initial Contacts
The research was initiated with a comprehensive review
of available literature on the spares acquisition process in
general and on the SAIP process in specific. The literature
reviewed in the study was obtained through the Naval Air
Systems Command, ASO, the Naval Postgraduate School Library,




Initial telephone contact was made with key personnel
in the ASO Acquisition Executive's Office and in the NAVAIR
Tactical Air Contracts Division. Contact with NAVAIR was
restricted to the Tactical Air Contracts Division because it
is the lead division for developing SAIP policy and procedures
for NAVAIR.
The main thrust of this research phase was to deter-
mine the theory behind SAIP and develop the background for
this thesis. The data gathered from this effort were present-
ed in the two previous chapters
.
3 . Mail Surveys
After sufficient background information was obtained
from the literature review and research questions were
formalized, mail surveys were sent to Government and contrac-
tor personnel highly experienced in the Government spares
acquisition process and SAIP in particular.
The surveys were designed to obtain subjective
information from experienced acquisition professionals on
their approaches to implementing SAIP and on the perceived
benefits and risks of the technique. Various sources were
consulted or reviewed to aid in the survey design. Two texts
were most helpful: Charles Smith's A Guide to Business
Research, and Rea and Parker's Designing and Conducting Survey-
Research [Ref . 7 and Ref . 8] . The intent of the surveys was
to gather opinions on the validity of SAIP theory and to
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solicit experiences and suggestions with applicability to
implementation of the SAIP technique in Naval aviation spares
procurement. It was also hoped that respondents would be able
to provide quantifiable savings data that would assist in
determining appropriate, cost effective, criteria for applying
SAIP4 . This survey approach necessitated limiting the survey
to experienced individuals at relatively high levels in the
procurement offices of the organizations contacted. The
assumption was that only such experienced personnel would be
able to offer the assessments and insights sought by the
survey. Questions, therefore, were generally open ended,
requiring short written answers designed to determine:
The extent of the respondent's personal knowledge and/or
experience with the SAIP concept.
Benefits, preferably quantifiable, obtained by using the
concept
.
Problems encountered in applying the concept.
Systematic procedures, if any, used in applying the
concept
Other lessons learned or recommendations for applying the
concept
Subjective assessments of SAIP concept applicability and
utility to aviation spares procurement.
Two separate questionnaires were developed - one for
use by Government agencies and one for use by commercial
4Cost effective in this context implies realizing net savings




contractors. The intent was to target the specific types of
information available from these divergent sources without
burdening respondents with questions that they would not
understand or that simply would not be applicable to their
situation. The two questionnaires and responses are repro-
duced in Appendices A and B.
Questionnaires were mailed to weapons managers and
contracting officials at ASO, NAVAIR, selected Air Force and
Army program offices, and aerospace contractors. The aero-
space contractors were selected based on recommendations by
the ASO Acquisition Executive's Office. Mail surveys were
followed up with telephone interviews to those respondents who
demonstrated the greatest interest and expertise in the
research area -- either to clarify their responses or to more
fully develop opinions and concepts discussed in their
responses.
4. On-Site Research
Once mail surveys had been distributed, and sufficient
responses had been received to gather a broader understanding
of issues and other service approaches to SAIP, on-site
research was conducted at NAVAIR, NAVSUP, and ASO. A visit
was made to the NAVSUP Cost Avoidance Office to obtain
information on any historical savings reported as a result of
implementing the SAIP technique. NAVAIR and ASO were visited
to:
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• Investigate existing procurement processes with respect to
SAIP.
• Review on-site documentary data on the SAIP process
(memos, reports, instructions, etc.).
• Conduct extensive personal interviews with key individuals
involved in the SAIP process to determine the issues,
gather personal assessments, and discuss potential changes
to the process.
Advance copies of the formal research questions and
the mail survey were sent to both NAVAIR and ASO so key points
of contact would understand the character of the research.
This step allowed them to prepare for the researcher's visit
by gathering appropriate materials and data and lining up
additional points of contact with experience or interest in
SAIP. On-site interviews were free- flowing discussions of the
SAIP universe with the survey questionnaire serving as a point
of departure for more detailed and wide ranging discussions.
Information was solicited from all survey respondents
and interviewees on a non- attributable basis to encourage
frank assessments and discussion of the SAIP technique. This
research methodology was effective for gathering data neces-
sary to answer the formal research questions.
B. RESEARCH DATA
1 . General
Data gathered from the research effort fell into the
following three general categories:
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• Opinions and recommendations of experienced acquisition
professionals regarding SAIP benefits, risks, and other
issues discussed in Chapter II of this paper.
• Limited quantitative and anecdotal information with
respect to successful application of the SAIP technique.
• Current NAVAIR/ASO procedures for implementing SAIP.
The following section will present some observations on
responses to the mail survey. Successive sections will
present the research findings -- first with respect to SAIP
theory and then with respect to current NAVAIR/ASO SAIP
procedures.
2 . Survey Responses
Table 1 provides some basic statistical data derived
from survey responses. Since the number of surveys was
limited, and the primary intent of the surveys was to gather
insights from other SAIP practitioners that might be applica-
ble to Naval aviation logistics, further statistical analysis
of responses to individual questions was not performed. As
stated earlier, the mail survey was intended to target highly
experienced acquisition professionals who could provide useful
insights and recommendations with regard to application of the
SAIP technique. Since comments were solicited on a non-
attributable basis, they are often cited in the following
sections without specific reference to individuals or organi-
zations. Table 1, therefore, illustrates the general level of
acquisition experience held by survey respondents, so the
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reader may have confidence that the goal of targeting highly-
experienced individuals was largely achieved.
TABLE I SURVEY RESPONSES
Government Industry
Surveys Mailed: 19 Surveys Mailed: 22
Surveys Returned: 12 Surveys Returned: 10
Percent Response: 63.16% Percent Response: 45 .45
Avg Yrs In Job: 7.00 Avg Yrs In Job: 7 .22






Std Deviation: 2.19 Std Deviation: 5 .31
Avg Yrs in Field: 14.60 Avg Yrs in Field: 25 .56
Minimum: 11 Minimum: 5
Maximum 23 Maximum 35
Std Deviation: 4.32 Std Deviation: 11 .23
Source: Developed by Author
One of the initial research findings was that little
effort has been made by any of the organizations contacted to
keep detailed statistics on how frequently SAIP is employed,
what it costs to employ, exactly how much money has been
saved, or what problems were encountered in applying the
technique. Survey respondents and interviewees could not
provide quantifiable data to support personal assessments and
opinions or that would be useful in determining cost effective
criteria for SAIP application. Lack of quantifiable data not
withstanding, the information they provided was valuable for
assessing the validity of SAIP theory.
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3. Validity of Theoretical SAIP Benefits
a. Price Savings and Determining Savings
All individuals contacted believed that SAIP would
generate price savings as a result of economies of scale.
They differed, however, on how such savings might be quanti-
fied.
The Air Force organizations contacted were not
required to report savings from the application of SAIP and
had not attempted, therefore, to determine savings. Army
offices also had not made little attempt to quantify SAIP
savings
.
Navy offices had been required to estimate SAIP
savings and report them in the Cost Avoidance Summary in the
BOSS report [Ref. 3:p. C-5] . Table 2 provides a matrix of
savings reported to NAVSUP on cost avoidance reports for
fiscal years 1985 - 1989. The cost avoidance reports submit-
ted to NAVSUP did not explain how savings were determined.
They generally just stated that savings were the result of
procuring spares concurrently with production items. Most
Navy personnel contacted in this study stated that the general
approach to determining savings was to estimate what a stand-
alone spares buy would have cost based on historical data or
contractor estimates of the cost of smaller production runs.
This stand-alone estimate would then be compared to actual
negotiated contract prices to estimate savings. The consensus
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was that this would be a "ballpark" estimate. If these
estimates are indeed in the "ballpark," the 8.5 percent of
total reported cost avoidance attributed to SAIP would appear
to be a substantial figure.
TABLE II NAVSUP COST AVOIDANCE SUMMARY
($ Millions)
FY 85 FY 86 FY 87 FY 88 FY 89
Breakout
ASO $141.9 $154.2 $134.9 $59.7 $99.4
SPCC $23.5 $25.0 $53.5 $34.4 $67.9
Other $27.3 $33.5 $1.2 $50.7 $38.4
Subtotal $192.7 $212.7 $189.6 $144.8 $205.7
Competition
Spares $79.5 $106.2 $140.6 $176.1 $11.8
Non-Spares $21.6 $6.8 $14.0 $2.8 $31.1
Sub Total $101.1 $113.0 $154.6 $178.9 $42.9
Price Fighter $1.5 $6.9 $31.6 $21.8 $22.9
SAIP/TSP $25.5 $44.7 $21.2 $41.0 $20.7
EOQ $6.6 $1.6 $0.1 $0.4 $0.1
Refunds $1.2 $2.4 $1.8 $1.4 $1.4
V/E $5.2 $6.7 $5.2
Total C/A $328.6 $381.3 $404.1 $395.0 $298.9
Source: NAVSUP Cost Avoidance Office
Contractors that responded were generally unable to
suggest more accurate methods for quantifying SAIP savings
.
One suggested that life cycle cost models such as LCC MOD/F-16
could be utilized to compute actual SAIP savings. However,
most felt determining savings without actually preparing two
proposals would be too difficult due to the large number of
variables involved in the pricing process. The overwhelming
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majority did assert that implementing a SAIP process would
generate substantial cost benefits. Contractor responses to
questions regarding factors responsible for SAIP savings were
quite varied. The primary factors they cited included:
• Avoidance of redundant seller set-up costs (flowing down
to subcontractors)
.
• Reduction in redundant administrative and handling costs.
• Economies of scale, particularly with respect to learning
curve effects and quantity discounts.
• Concurrent make or buy planning by industry.
• Savings in lead time required to deliver negotiated spares
on prime production contracts and better configuration
control which result in cost savings (One contractor
estimated that lead time could be reduced by as much as
fifty percent)
.
Economy of scale was noted by all Government and industry
respondents as the chief savings factor in SAIP procurements -
- outweighing other factors by a very large degree. Regard-
less of how much money is saved, or how savings are estimated,
the respondents attitudes towards savings are best summarized
by one respondent's comment that savings in SAIP are "...an
article of faith." [Ref. 6]
b. Greater Visibility of Prices
No information was obtained from the survey that
would tend to directly validate or invalidate the assumption
of greater price visibility. The research data did confirm
that it can be difficult for spares contracting activities to
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obtain timely notification of production contracting efforts.
This situation, though, was viewed as an impediment to
employing the SAIP technique, rather than a condition that
would be mitigated by SAIP.
c. Reduced Administrative Burden.
Several respondents, mostly from industry (only one
was from Government) , mentioned reduced administrative burden
as a benefit under the assumption that spares and production
items would be included on the same contract. However, on-
site research and discussions with individuals at NAVAIR and
ASO indicated that the degree of coordination required to
include spares on production contracts involved considerable
administrative effort. Individuals from both commands
expressed a degree of frustration with the time and effort
required to effect a SAIP procurement.
d. Better Configuration Control
Few respondents viewed better configuration control
as a benefit of SAIP. Most viewed configuration control and
obsolescence as a risk, but one that is manageable. Those who
believed configuration control was a benefit, attributed the
benefit to concurrent production that allowed spares to be
produced in the same configuration as the end item. This
position assumed contractual clauses requiring spares quanti-
ties to be produced in an appropriate ratio to production
items. Those who viewed configuration control as a risk
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generally attributed the risk to obsolescence that would
result if spares were bought concurrently with production
before system design was stabilized.
No survey respondent or interviewee offered
quantitative or anecdotal evidence to support there assertions
of configuration control as risk or benefit. However, Arthur
and Fisher [Ref . 28] conducted a study in 1980 to investigate
the influence of SAIP on the obsolescence of spare parts in
the A- 10 program. This study used statistical methods to
compare the incidence of obsolescence of A- 10 SAIP spares
procured early in the provisioning process with stand-alone
spares buys for the same aircraft. The authors concluded that
there was no statistically significant difference in obsoles-
cence rates. They also stated they were unable to determine
why the SAIP spares did not suffer a higher rate of obsoles-
cence since they were purchased earlier. It is interesting to
note, though, that the SAIP contract required spares to be
modified when ECPs changed the system design and also required
spares to be produced in a specific ratio to production
installation items. [Ref. 28 :p. 30]
e. Enhanced Readiness
Only two Government and two industry respondents
mentioned enhanced readiness as a benefit of the SAIP tech-
nique. In each of these responses, enhanced readiness was
attributed to concurrent production of spares resulting in
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greater spares availability when systems are first fielded.
Both Government respondents were from Air Force contracting
offices. Air Force contracting organizations limit applica-
tion of the SAIP technique to initial provisioning require-
ments, which might explain why they would view enhanced
readiness as a consistent benefit of SAIP.
4. Validity of Theoretical SAIP Risks
a. Obsolescence and Overprocurement
As discussed above, the majority of respondents
viewed obsolescence and overprocurement as a potential risk of
SAIP. This risk was attributed to design instability, in that
changing designs could render spares obsolete if they were
procured early enough in the provisioning process to be
consolidated with end item production. No respondents
mentioned the possibility of overprocurement as a result of
simply ordering too many spares prior to an adequate demand
development period.
b. Avallability of Funding
Availability of funding was not a topic of particu-
lar concern in survey responses, but on-site research revealed
that funding issues can be an area of considerable risk. For
example, in 199 NAVAIR was in the process of breaking out a
requirement for the APG 71 radar. The buy required some long
lead funding. ASO also wanted to participate in the acquisi-
tion. Specifically, they wanted AWG-9 transmitters and power
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supplies which are subcomponents of the APG 71 radar. They
forwarded their requirements to NAVAIR, and those requirements
were included on the advanced acquisition contract negotiated
by NAVAIR. ASO was expected to provide funding prior to an
order being placed against the contract for delivery of their
requirements. ASO had difficulty providing the funds and
considered dropping their requirements. This situation
generated considerable concern at NAVAIR since ASO's require-
ments were part of the total pricing equation. Individuals
involved in the process acknowledged that a pull out by ASO
would have required renegotiation of the whole contract.
c. Dynamic Requirements
The research disclosed a very substantial risk of
SAIP that was not mentioned in the literature. Unstable
replenishment requirements may cause severe perturbations in
a SAIP arrangement. Discussions with NAVAIR contracting
officials and ASO weapon managers revealed that ASO's spares
requirements are subject to quantity variations over time as
a result of demand and inventory fluctuations. The earlier
spares are ordered in advance of the projected need date, the
more likely the quantity requirement is to vary. The nature
of SAIP generally requires spares to be ordered earlier than
they would otherwise be, so production windows can be met. As
a consequence, the risk of variation in required quantity may
be greater in a SAIP procurement than in others
.
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Interviewees at both sites stressed that NAVAIR and ASO
must agree on the quantity requirement, since prices are
negotiated based on the total quantity. If one party chooses
to vary quantities or pull out of a contract, it impacts the
unit price paid by the other party since the scale of the
total buy is reduced. Such situations may require renegotia-
tion of the contract, and may result in termination liability
for the contracting command even though it was the other
command that pulled out of the contract. Contracting
personnel interviewed at NAVAIR expressed extreme sensitivity
to this issue.
5 . Research Findings On Other SAIP Issues
a. Prime Contractor Versus Subcontractor
The questions of whether SAIP procurements should
be made with prime or subcontractors and whether they should
be on the same contract as production items or a separate
concurrent contract elicited fairly polarized responses. Air
Force offices were unanimous in the belief that SAIP should be
restricted to prime contractors and that all requirements
should be included on the production contract. Some respon-
dents even felt that restricting SAIP to prime contractors was
required by regulation. This belief, however, is inaccurate.
Air Force Regulation 800-26 specifically requires contractors
to identify items on the SAIP list that can be broken out to
the actual manufacturer and to provide the contractor's
59
procurement schedule for SAIP [Ref . 19 :p. 2] . Such a require-
ment would seem to imply that SAIP spares may be obtained from
subcontractors
.
Navy responses to the question were mixed and
implied a greater degree of flexibility. The feeling was that
each approach had benefits and costs and that the decision
should be based on the imperatives of the contract at hand.
Contractors also felt ordering from the prime on
the same contract as production items was the preferable
approach to SAIP. All respondents generally offered the same
factors for consideration in the decision:
It is easier to coordinate the requirements through the
prime
.
Purchasing through the prime is the best way to ensure
effective configuration control.
Placing the requirements on one contract reduces the
administrative burden and cost.
Purchasing through the prime mandates ILS participation by
both industry and Government to separately manage SAIP
spares
.
Purchasing through the prime ties everything together and
holds the prime contractor responsible.
Purchasing through the prime is the simplest, least
expensive, and most direct way of contracting (least
expensive here refers to the cost of placing and adminis-
tering the contract, not the price of the contract)
.
Purchasing through subcontractors will result in lower
prices since prime contractors add-on charges will be
avoided.
Designs must be stable if SAIP purchases are to be made
through subcontractors.
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The differing attitudes on this issue between Navy
and Air Force organizations is understandable when it is
recalled that the Air Force limits application of SAIP to
initial provisioning requirements. Under that circumstance,
early in the system life cycle, designs tend to be unstable
and the Government is usually in a sole source position.
Jb. Timing and Coordination
The research revealed that timing and coordination
is an issue that is applicable primarily to replenishment SAIP
requirements. The comment made time and again by individuals
involved in the SAIP process at both NAVAIR and ASO was that
they often "missed the window" on SAIP opportunities. This
comment means that spares requirements were not determined
early enough and communicated to NAVAIR, and/or contractors
and vendors, in time to have the additional material require-
ments added to the contractor's procurement orders. Individu-
als at ASO tended to believe they did not get adequate and
consistent notification of ordering windows and that investi-
gating to determine if SAIP opportunities exist when procure-
ment requests are being generated is too tedious a process.
Contractors, on the other ha-nd, believed that the Government
received timely notification, but failed to act swiftly to
take advantage of the opportunities.
This factor is of critical importance in SAIP
savings. To achieve maximum benefit from economies of scale,
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procurements must be consolidated not just in time to meet
contractor production schedules, but to meet contractor
material order release schedules [Ref. 29, 29]. In this way-
contractors get a cost benefit from larger material orders
that can be passed on to the Government
.
Much effort has been devoted to improving and
systematizing the process by which weapons managers and item
managers at ASO are notified about SAIP opportunities and
ordering windows. Research on-site revealed that several
parallel, concurrent approaches are being taken by differing
offices within these two commands to that end. These separate
approaches will be discussed in a following section on current
processes
.
c. Variations of the SAIP Technique
In Chapter II, four possible variations of the SAIP
technique were discussed. When questioned about which of the
variations was preferred the vast majority of survey respon-
dents chose the first variation: combining all requirements on
one Government contract with the prime contractor. The
rationale for this choice was the same discussed above with
respect to ordering SAIP spares from prime contractors versus
subcontractors: easier and less costly negotiation and
administration, and better configuration control.
However, discussions held at ASO, NAVAIR and with
several contractors indicated a great deal of interest in the
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possibility of consolidating ASO spares procurements with
other customer requirements in addition to NAVAIR's production
requirements. "Other" customers would include other service
production or spares purchases or possibly foreign military
and even commercial sales. The consensus was that although
such purchases would most likely not be on the same contract,
concurrent timing of orders for the same part, or parts that
required similar processes and materials, would still result
in savings concomitant to larger production runs. This
variation, though, would require an efficient means for
contractors to routinely notify all potential customers of
procurement order release dates for specific items. [Ref . 26
and Ref. 29, 29]
d. Provisioning Versus Replenishment
Responses to this issue were also polarized. Most
respondents felt there was potential for generating SAIP
savings on replenishment requirements. The Air Force, as
stated earlier, does not attempt SAIP with replenishment
actions. The prevalent attitude was that coordination and
timing issues for replenishment actions were too difficult to
overcome. They preferred to rely on competition and Breakout
to generate savings on replenishment actions.
In marked contrast to the Air Force, ASO is
interested in obtaining SAIP savings wherever possible,
including replenishment requirements. At the same time,
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officials at NAVAIR and ASO admit that the difficulties of
trying to coordinate SAIP replenishment have hampered system-
atic consideration of SAIP in replenishment actions. [Ref . 26
and Ref. 29, 29]
Survey responses indicated that contractors
generally felt the Government should try to apply SAIP to both
types of requirements
.
e. Selection of SAIP Candidates
All respondents agreed with the criteria for SAIP
candidates provided by former DoD Instruction 4245.12 (Chapter
II, section C.5.e) . Most respondents suggested the additional
criterion of design stability. Most also suggested that the
technique should be restricted to high cost repairable items,
although it could conceivably be applied to low cost consum-
able items as well. The implication was that the greater
effort involved in coordinating a consolidated purchase action
could best be justified by the higher payoff to be obtained
from high cost items. Consumable items were likely to have a
lower payoff, and be more subject to Breakout and competition
as alternatives to SAIP. Most individuals at ASO also
suggested that SAIP should be restricted to sole source
procurements
.
f. SAIP Versus Competition and Breakout
No one responding to this research project saw any
conflict between the SAIP technique and competition or
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Breakout. This view is based on the fact that competition and
Breakout are required by law and SAIP is not. SAIP was most
often seen as a tool that could be used to obtain savings when
competition and Breakout were not feasible, that is, in a sole
source situation.
C. THE ASO/NAVAIR SAIP PROCESSES
1 . Introduction
One of the objectives of the on-site research was to
discover how ASO and NAVAIR currently implement the SAIP
technique and to obtain recommendations from key individuals
on how the process might be improved. It was found that four
general processes are being followed to identify SAIP opportu-
nities which overlap each other to varying degrees. These
approaches can be categorized by which command initiates the
process, the lines of communication, and the level of formali-
ty or regulation of the process. Before discussing these
approaches, it will be helpful to place them in the context of
ASO's overall SAIP philosophy.
ASO provided the chart below that illustrates the
potential lines of communication for pursuing SAIP opportuni-
ties. The chart is important in that it emphasizes ASO's
flexible approach to investigating various avenues to obtain
SAIP savings. According to ASO, "SAIP is one of several
techniques to be considered in the overall spares acquisition
and logistical support process. .
.
,
" which embraces a " . . . com-
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mon sense approach to providing affordable support while
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Figure 3 SAIP Communication Paths [Ref. 29 :p. 6]
simply, there are no predefined limits on how SAIP should be
implemented. It is a technique that item managers are
encouraged to apply to any procurement if there is an opportu-
nity to do so and estimated savings make it worth the effort
(usually a subjective decision)
.
In the interest of ensuring that SAIP is at least
considered prior to a procurement action, item managers must
tell a Requirements Review Board whether SAIP was considered
for the procurement in question. Requirements Review Boards
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are convened by the ASO Operations Directorate before execu-
tion of contract actions to determine if requirements have
been calculated properly [Ref . 27 :p. 1] . Item managers can
resort to any one of the four approaches mentioned above to
determine if a SAIP opportunity exists. These approaches
include processes initiated by ASO and processes initiated by
NAVAIR
.
2. ASO Initiated Processes
a. The Informal Process
Every weapon systems manager interviewed in the ASO
Operations Directorate described a relatively unstructured
process for initiating SAIP procurements. Weapon systems
managers at ASO who are tasked to manage spares inventories
for specific systems tend to stay in constant communication
with either the NAVAIR program managers (PM) or assistant
program managers for logistics (APML) with responsibility for
those same systems. This constant communication allows
managers from both commands to stay abreast of significant
developments in the life cycle support of a system such as
readiness issues, system modifications, and major end item or
spares buys. Because of this close contact, weapon systems
managers are usually aware of major, upcoming production
contract awards, or lot deliveries, and APMLs are apt to be
aware of major spares procurements. Major in this context may
be taken to mean high dollar value buys for major system
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components at the WRA or, possibly, SRA level. Such procure-
ments are usually subject to a sole source situation. With
PMAs/APMLs and weapons managers both being sensitive to
program costs, it is natural to investigate the possibility of
implementing SAIP in this situation. If a production contract
award is pending and a major spares requirement exists, the
ASO weapon systems manager may seek to pass his requirement to
NAVAIR for inclusion in the production contract.
There are two major advantages to doing this from
ASO's perspective. One obvious advantage is the assumed SAIP
savings for both NAVAIR and ASO that will result from the
effort. Another fortuitous consequence of such a transaction
is that non- competitive contract actions will be removed from
ASO's contract base, thus increasing their percentage of
competitive contract awards. This is not a disadvantage for
NAVAIR because NAVAIR' s interest in competition occurs early
in program life, so follow- on production contracts are
invariably sole source 5 .
It is readily apparent that this process does not
involve a systematic approach. Participants report that
coordination of these actions is particularly difficult and
5NAVAIR does have a component breakout program by which
Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) is procured directly by the
Government and provided to the contractor as Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) . Components should be broken out if it will result
in substantial savings, and the action will not • jeopardize the
quality, reliability, performance or timely delivery of the end
item. [Ref. 31:p. 1]
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time consuming and that the opportunities tend to be serendip-
itous [Ref. 29, 29]. Non- systematic and serendipitous though
this process may be, it apparently is the most frequent route
by which SAIP is employed. The research did not reveal a
specific percentage of successful SAIP actions that followed
this process, but most ASO weapon managers could not provide
anecdotal evidence of any other process being employed.
Jb. A More Systematic Process
The ASO Acquisition Executive's Office has made
some forays into a more systematic process to uncover SAIP
opportunities. In this process, the Acquisition Executive's
Office periodically queries NAVAIR's Procurement Request
Management Information System (PRMIS) via modem and downloads
information on open NAVAIR procurement actions to a PC in the
Acquisition Executive's Office. The entire NAVAIR Contracts
Division database is maintained on PRMIS, and the system
provides a wealth of information with respect to pending
procurement actions: system, contractor, contract type,
responsible office, dollar value, etc. [Ref. 34:p. 20]. It
does not, however provide information on individual contract
line item numbers (CLINs)
.
The downloaded information is maintained in a
smaller database in the Acquisition Executive's office.
Listings are produced from this database and distributed to
69
weapon systems managers so the can investigate listed actions
for SAIP opportunities.
Weapon systems managers questioned about the
listings reported receiving them on a periodic basis, but were
not able to identify any successful SAIP procurements that had
resulted from this effort. The primary concern reported with
the listings was the that information on them was not detailed
enough to allow immediate identification of a SAIP candidate.
For example, the listings provide only nomencla-
tures for systems with pending procurement actions. No stock
numbers or part numbers are provided, i.e., information that
would be found in individual CLINs . Interested weapon systems
managers or item managers would have to initiate telephone
conversations with individual contract officers at NAVAIR to
determine specific systems or components that were being
ordered and then try to determine if ASO was in a buy position
for any of those systems or subcomponents of those systems.
The impression given to the researcher was that a top-down-
breakdown analysis would have to be performed on each listed
system before any effort could begin to match listed procure-
ment actions to ASO's requirements.
Weapon systems managers saw no easy way to match
this product to System Demand Reviews (SDR) 6 or stratifica-
6The Supply Demand Review (SDR) is the automated requirements
determination process used by ASO to develop procurement require-
ments. It is run quarterly. [Ref. 32 :p. 1]
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tion listings 7 . The concern was that efforts to do so would
undoubtedly be very time consuming with no promise of a
payoff
.
c. A Formal Process
ASO has a formal set of procedures that are to be
followed once a SAIP opportunity has been identified for a
given procurement action . The procedures are contained in OP
Policy and Procedure Memo #76. This document primarily
provides detailed internal procedures for executing a SAIP
procurement. It covers routing of procurement requests, time
frames for processing, and reporting requirements.
Only one paragraph is devoted to a procedure for
identifying SAIP candidates. Inventory managers or equipment
specialists are directed to request production procurement
requirements lists from prime contractors or GFE production
procurement requirements lists from NAVAIR. They are then to
compute spares requirements for items on the lists and
initiate procurement requests if appropriate. No weapon
systems managers referred to this memo or its procedures when
discussing SAIP transactions. Some mention was made of
obtaining production procurement schedules from contractors,
7Stratification listings are ASO's budgeting tool. They are
based on the same parameters as those use for requirements
determination (reorders) , and they project future procurement and
repair requirements on a line item basis [Ref. 33 :p. 10]
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but this was presented as an ad- hoc process, concomitant to
the informal process discussed above. [Ref. 35 :p. 2]
An interesting aspect of this document, is its
mention of "reverse SAIP."
The REVERSE SAIP concept is a unique ASO approach intended
to allow a prime contractor to combine spares with a
production order and propose a unit price less than a
stand alone spares proposal by an OEM. [Ref. 35 :p. 1]
As understood by the researcher, reverse SAIP
allows prime contractors to compete for a spares procurement
with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in what would
otherwise be a sole source environment. The prime, by
combining the Government's spares requirement with his
production order can achieve unit prices lower than the OEM
can offer on a stand alone buy. The case offered as an
example was one in which IBM had remaining inventory from a
previous, large production buy that it was subsequently able
to offer to the Government at a lower price than the OEM [Ref.
30] . It is interesting to note that this situation is very
similar to the first McDonnell Aircraft SAIP offer to the
Government on the F-15 program discussed in Chapter II.
3 . NAVAIR Initiated Processes
a. Draft Procurement Request (PR)
A review of various ASO and NAVAIR internal
memoranda and brief sheets on SAIP indicated that there was no
systematic process for identifying SAIP opportunities prior to
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1989. SAIP efforts before 1989 appear to have been restricted
to the ad-hoc process previously discussed. In 1989, however,
ASO and NAVAIR began efforts to develop a more systematic and
formal process. In meetings conducted between the two
commands on the SAIP issue, it was discovered that NAVAIR was
routinely forwarding copies of draft RFPs to ASO so CDRL
requirements could be reviewed. These RFPs were found to be
quite complete, as they cited specific CLINs, and they seemed
an ideal vehicle for notifying weapon systems managers at ASO
of possible SAIP opportunities. Therefore, ASO and NAVAIR
agreed that all draft RFPs sent to ASO would be routed to
appropriate weapon systems managers so the CLINs could be
reviewed for SAIP candidates. This practice has apparently
been followed fairly consistently, since it was found that the
ASO Operations Policy and Control Division (code 035) still
receives the RFPs, attaches a cover memorandum to them and
forwards them to weapon systems managers. [Ref . 3 6 :p. 1]
The memorandum requests spares managers to review
section "B" of the PR (Supplies or Services) , which lists
specific CLINS, and match them to their WRA and SRA require-
ments. If they discover SAIP opportunities, they are then
supposed to initiate a request for consolidated procurement
(RCP) and send it to NAVAIR. If they do not have requirements
for any of the items listed in the PR, they are to return the
cover memo to code 035 with a note stating that no procurement
is to be made.
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Discussions with weapon systems managers at ASO
indicate that this process has also met with limited success.
The primary complaint was that most draft RFPs are received
too far in advance of projected order or delivery dates for
item managers to accurately determine requirements. Again,
this process offers no electronic interface to ASO's automated
requirements determination process, so the manual screening
process is still time consuming with a remote chance of
payoff. The impression gained was that there was simply
insufficient time available to devote to this sort of effort.
The following quote from a July 1992 memo returned to code 035
illustrates the type of obstacles item managers face in
pursuing this process:
ASO will not be able to exercise any procurements
for SAIP opportunity due to 1) NAVAIR award date will be
10-15-92 and 2) ASO does not have any information which
will enable us to know what to buy by 10-15-92.
We will keep in touch with NAVAIR when they release
their SPARES order for SML buy- in and exercise our
procurements. [Ref. 37 :p. 1]
The NAVAIR SAIP Policy and Procedures Memorandum, which will
be discussed in the following section, also comments on the
limitations of this draft PR process:
2. The existing process provides for incorporation of
interim and replenishment spares into the PR. Draft Prs
are provided to the Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO)
,
Philadelphia, for incorporation of spares. This process,
as it exists, has proved inadequate in responding to ASO
demand, funding volatility, and limited opportunities for
combined buys. [Appendix C: p.l]
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In order to address these deficiencies, NAVAIR
developed a new process that attempts a higher degree of
systematization and more effective use of automated data
processing capabilities- The following section discusses this
process.
Jb. Contractor Procurement Order Release Schedules
As had been previously discussed, the key to
obtaining SAIP savings is to consolidate spares requirements
with production requirements early enough to get them included
on contractor's material orders for the production contract.
NAVAIR acknowledged shortcomings in the earlier SAIP process
in this regard. NAVAIR also recognized that for the processes
to be effective, the difficult step of matching ASO's require-
ments to contractor's productions procurement cycles would
have to be facilitated. The NAVAIR Tactical Aircraft Con-
tracts Division (Air-214) was given lead responsibilities for
improving the process. After identifying the process short-
comings discussed above, Air-214 developed a prototype process
that concentrated on timely determination and communication of
contractor's procurement order release schedules, and that
sought to take maximum advantage of automated data processing
capabilities to perform the arduous screening and matching
actions that had thus far hindered more effective SAIP
implementation. [Ref. 29, 29]
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The process prototyped by AIR- 214 concentrates on
matching ASO spares requirements with contractor annual
procurement order release schedules rather than the NAVAIR
fiscal year procurement cycle. Contractors are requested, by
letter, to participate in the process by agreeing to notify
the Government of their procurement order release schedules
and to combine the Navy's requirements with their own to the
extent allowable within their existing procurement systems.
If the prime contractor agrees to participate, all
annual year procurement contracts with that contractor will be
structured with a SAIP line item. The SAIP line item is
structured as a PIO line item. A CDRL and data item descrip-
tion (DID DI-V-7200) are also included to task the contractor
to provide his annual release schedule in the contractor's
format but, ideally, a hard copy listing and floppy disk would
be provided. When ASO receives the listing and disk, they can
be matched to ASO's requirements. Weapon systems managers may
upload the floppy disk listing to the ASO database to compare
and match records. A stratified requirements listing may then
be produced for any matches. The NAVAIR PCO, a DPRO ACO, or an
ASO contracting officer may be designated as ordering offi-
cers. An important innovation in this process was an acknowl-
edgement that ASO/NAVAIR coordination might not be necessary
to achieve SAIP savings. Once contractors provided their
procurement release dates to ASO, it might be possible for ASO
to work directly with the contractor to consolidate require-
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ments rather than trying to add their requirements to one of
NAVAIR's contracts (ASO's desire to offload noncompetitive
contract actions notwithstanding) . The NAVAIR Operations and
Procedures Memorandum which outlines this process is repro-
duced in Appendix C.
Clearly, this process is intended to directly
address what appeared to be the key shortcomings of earlier
processes. Extensive effort when into prototyping it. The
Grumman corporation worked closely with NAVAIR to address
contractor concerns and work the "bugs" out of the process.
Concerns expressed by Grumman were that if contractors were
not able to provide the listing in their own format, reformat-
ting costs might result in unnecessary contract cost growth.
The company also felt the language calling for the submission
of contractor procurement schedules should be clarified to
stress that the information provided was "planning" data and
therefore subject to change. Finally, Grumman suggested that
some "mutuality" might be included in the provisions, e.g., if
contractors were notified when ASO was planning a large buy,
contractors might find it beneficial to accelerate their
purchases to be in synchronization with ASO. [Ref. 38 :p. 1]
A review of several internal memorandums, facsimile
transmittals, and e-mail transmissions between NAVAIR, ASO,
Grumman, and McDonnell Douglas, indicated extensive coordina-
tion was still required to close on SAIP opportunities even
with this more automated process. In one case listings
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provided by the Government, were not in a useable form for the
contractor (e.g., different part numbers) and required cross
referencing by the contractor. In other cases (notably the E-
2C program) simply matching up items, quantities, dates, and
funding to meet contractor release dates was still a time
consuming process requiring the involvement of higher level
management (weapon systems managers vice item managers) . The
process does appear, though, to have achieved some measure of
success. In 1989, NAVAIR and ASO reported $2 00,000 in SAIP
savings on a McDonnell Douglas contract and $1,500,000 in SAIP




D. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
The research effort uncovered few solid statistics and
limited archival data by which to analyze the SAIP technique.
The data that were obtained, though (anecdotes, internal
memorandums, survey and interview responses, and cost avoid-
ance reports)
,
provide ample information to analyze the SAIP
technique with respect to Naval aviation and assess the
benefits of the process, the degree of success achieved by the
Naval Air community in realizing those benefits, circumstances




A. SAIP: IS THE DEFINITION ADEQUATE?
In the introduction to this paper, SAIP was identified as
the implementation of a policy whereby spares are purchased
concurrently with end item production. Chapter II provided a
more formal definition taken from DoD Instruction 5000.1:
A procedure used to combine procurement of selected spares
with procurement of identical items produced for installa-
tion on the primary system, subsystem, or equipment. [Ref
.
l:p. 15-16]]
The Air Force provides still another variation on this same
theme in AF Regulation 800-26:
A technique used to combine ordering and production of
spares- (both initial and replenishment) with identical
items produced for installation on the end item to be
delivered to the user. [Ref. 19 :p. 1]
All of these definitions would seem to limit the "SAIP"
technique to procurement of spares concurrently with produc-
tion of identical end items . However, the data obtained from
the research effort suggests that such a definition might be
unnecessarily restrictive.
In ASO's chart depicting potential information exchange
paths for SAIP opportunities, reproduced in Figure 3 in
Chapter IV, major spares acquisitions from AVSCOM and
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AFLCs/AMAs are offered as SAIP opportunities. Such acquisi-
tions are certainly not for "end item production. " Another
finding of the research, presented in the section on varia-
tions of the SAIP technique, was that many research partici-
pants felt SAIP savings concomitant to larger production runs
could be obtained if purchases were combined, not just for
identical items, but for items requiring similar materials and
processes . This notion is supported by the finding that the
largest SAIP savings result from the price breaks that
contractors receive from their suppliers for placing larger
material orders and from avoiding redundant production setup
costs. To achieve savings, then, a SAIP candidate need not be
in the identical configuration as other items being produced
as long as it requires similar materials and fabrication
processes
.
Clearly, ASO does not want to limit consideration of the
SAIP technique to the boundaries suggested either by the
official definition of the term or the term itself: "Spares
Acquisition Integrated with Production. " Spares do not
necessarily have to be in the identical configuration as
production items, and the spares procurement does not neces-
sarily have to be combined with a procurement for production
end items. From this perspective, SAIP can be considered a
technique for obtaining economies of scale in spares acquisi-
tion by consolidating one organization's spares procurement
with some other customers' procurement for items that require
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the same, or similar, materials and fabrication processes.
"Other customers" could be expanded to include other services,
other governments, or even commercial customers. Aircraft
such as C-130s, C-9s, and H-ls would appear to have a very
large customer base and, therefore, SAIP potential. Caution
must be taken, though, with this line of reasoning. Just
because some other party owns the same piece of equipment does
not mean that SAIP procurements must be pursued every time a
spare is purchased. There are other factors to be considered
such as the amount of effort required to coordinate the
procurement and whether the payoff will justify the effort.
Everyone living on a neighborhood street could form a coop to
buy light bulbs at the same time and undoubtedly receive a
price break on the large, combined purchase quantity. But it
would hardly seem worth the effort.
The reason for concern with the definition of SAIP, is
that the definition of the technique, if unnecessarily
restrictive, may unnecessarily restrict consideration of
alternatives for implementing the technique and achieving
savings
.
B. IS SAIP WORTH THE EFFORT?
One fact confirmed by the research is that execution of
the simple SAIP concept can be a very complicated and labori-
ous experience. Regardless of the process employed, searching
for SAIP opportunities and closing on those opportunities
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invariably requires hours of additional effort unique to the
SAIP process. There have been no statistical comparisons of
procurement lead time on SAIP actions as opposed to non-SAIP
actions, and such studies were beyond the scope of this
project. However, there was certainly no evidence to suggest
that a SAIP procurement would require less time than a non-
SAIP procurement, and there is nothing in the process that
allows any normal contracting steps to be skipped. Despite
the fact that NAVAIR has historically been responsible for
negotiating and awarding SAIP contracts, ASO's involvement has
not ceased with the passing of RCPs to a NAVAIR contracting
officer. When spares and production requirements are combined
onto one contract, ASO and NAVAIR must coordinate closely on
timing, quantity, and funding issues. Because of the dynamic
nature of ASO's requirements, such coordination efforts must
continue right up to contract award. These efforts on
historical SAIP transactions have been intense and protracted
affairs, involving relatively high management levels (weapon
systems managers, APMLs, highly place contractor executives,
etc.) . Though the study was not able to quantify them, the
financial costs of such efforts are probably significant.
There are costs other than financial, though, that must be
considered in the SAIP equation.
Survey and interview responses indicate that the cost of
implementing the SAIP technique in terms of frustration and
discouragement of participants in the process is high. A few
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respondents even indicated a hesitancy to be involved in the
process again. Despite this disenchantment with the process,
all believed that SAIP efforts had resulted in substantial
cost savings, and that efforts should continue to implement
the SAIP technique wherever possible.
The NAVSUP savings data presented in Table II also
indicate that, from a cost perspective, SAIP is worth the
effort involved in its implementation. $153 million in
savings over five years is a significant amount even if it is
just a "ballpark" figure. This is especially true when it is
considered that research respondents generally stated that
they tried to keep their estimates "conservative."
The research findings were less clear-cut on the other
presumed benefits of SAIP. The rationale offered for SAIP
ensuring better configuration control depends on SAIP actions
being executed with the prime contractor. There is nothing in
the SAIP model that requires that the technique be executed
with the prime, nor is there any prohibition against executing
non-SAIP actions with the prime if configuration control is
the overriding objective. One could argue, therefore, that
configuration control is an acquisition objective that may be
achieved with or without implementation of the SAIP technique.
It is dependent on contractual language tasking the prime
contractor to ensure spares are delivered in an appropriate
configuration, not on placing a spares buy concurrently with
a production buy.
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As with configuration control, the study provided no
evidence with which to assess the affect of SAIP on readiness.
Although the theoretical rationale for SAIP's effect on
increasing readiness is compelling, one could surmise that
such an effect is most likely due to ordering spares earlier
in the provisioning process than normal, rather than combining
a spares order with a production order to achieve larger
production runs. Could not the same result be achieved by
ordering spares earlier without regard to concurrent timing of
production orders? The SAIP model implies placing spares
procurements concurrently with end item production runs to
achieve economies of scale. It does not, however, dictate
which production lot a spares buy must be combined with.
Executing a SAIP action on later production lots would not
seem to offer the readiness benefits suggested by the theoret-
ical model . The obsolescence and overprocurement risks
(costs) discussed in the theoretical model may be dispatched
with the same line of reasoning, i.e., they are risks that are
related more to timing of initial spares buys with respect to
the life cycle of the system rather than consolidating spares
buys with a particular production lot.
The point to be made, based on the research data and this
analysis of the costs and benefits, is that SAIP does appear
to be "worth the effort" when estimated financial savings are
compared to the costs or risks of SAIP. One should exercise
caution, however, in imputing any benefits to SAIP other than
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economies of scale that result from the consolidation of
requirements
.
Unfortunately, the consideration of potential SAIP
benefits may have less bearing on how aggressively spares
purchasers seek to implement the technique, than the "pain"
involved in the process of implementing it. SAIP participants
can be compared to a woman in a hospital delivery room who
loves her new-born baby but never wants to give birth again.
If they are to remain excited about the process, ways must be
found to make it less painful
.
C. DOES SAIP CONFLICT WITH OTHER PROCUREMENT OBJECTIVES?
SAIP is not required by law and competition is. That
simple fact would seem to resolve any concern about whether
there is any conflict between the SAIP technique and competi-
tion or Breakout. If it was obvious that the prime contractor
could offer SAIP savings that resulted in a lower price than
any potential competitor could offer, then a J&A could be
obtained to authorize the sole source procurement. This
scenario raises the delicate ethical question, though, of how
the Government could come by such information in a competitive
environment. It seems more likely that a contractor with
knowledge of the Government's required delivery date and other
customer requirements, would naturally plan to consolidate
both orders and obtain economies of scale in order to offer a
more competitive price. Maybe this phenomenon can be called
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Auto-SAIP -- the Government benefits from SAIP without
specifically addressing SAIP in the RFP or bid request.
Breakout would appear to be less of a problem for SAIP
than a competitive environment. The purpose of Breakout is to
create a competitive environment to save money. However, if
estimated SAIP savings are substantial, an appropriate
decision might be to delay Breakout. A prime contractor's
SAIP offer in this instance, though, would have to be reviewed
carefully to ensure that low prices actually represent SAIP
savings rather than a prime contractor attempt to hinder
breakout
.
Another point of consideration is that savings from
competition and breakout reported to NAVSUP under the BOSS
program far exceed any savings reported from SAIP. This would
seem to indicate that a wise approach would be to always seek
competition and/or Breakout and reserve SAIP consideration for
non- competitive procurements.
D. WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T?
1. Comparison of Processes
It has been suggested, that, unless the SAIP process
is "easy, " weapon systems managers will not routinely check
for SAIP opportunities. The preceding chapter discussed
several different approaches that NAVAIR and ASO have taken to
implementing SAIP. These approaches have yielded varying
levels of success and have been embraced by participants with
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varying levels of enthusiasm. Comparing and contrasting the
various processes is helpful in identifying which features
make implementation of the SAIP technique "easy" and which
features tend to make implementation more difficult.
The ad-hoc process, although requiring extensive
coordination, appears to have several advantages with respect
to ease of implementation. To start with, weapon systems
managers or item managers are already aware of the requirement
to procure a particular spare (most likely as a result of the
SDR process) . The known requirement (and presumably, its high
money value) is what motivates them to initiate the process in
the first place. Additionally, having maintained liaison with
the NAVAIR APML, they are generally aware of pending produc-
tion procurements, and they already have a NAVAIR point of
contact with which to investigate SAIP potential. Contrast
this situation with both the draft RFP and PRIMIS database
extract process
.
In both of these processes, weapon systems managers
are provided with products to be used for investigating SAIP
opportunities before any spares requirement has been identi-
fied. They must then investigate to see which items NAVAIR is
procuring, determine if a spares requirement exists for those
same items, and if so, take steps to establish liaison with an
appropriate NAVAIR point of contact to coordinate the SAIP
procurement. Once liaison is established additional efforts
must be made to obtain procurement order release schedules
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from the contractor, i.e., determine the SAIP ordering window.
This front end screening effort appears to be minimized by the
ad-hoc process with the possible exception of determining SAIP
ordering windows
.
The NAVAIR procurement order release schedule process,
if implemented as conceived, may also offer advantages in ease
of implementation. If procurement order release schedules
provided by contractors are electronically matched to the ASO
database to produce stratified listings of spares with
projected replenishment requirements, the step of investigat-
ing to see if a requirement exists has already been accom-
plished by the time the stratified listing and procurement
order release schedules are dropped on a manager's desk.
Further coordination with NAVAIR may be unnecessary, since the
NAVAIR production contract should already contain a SAIP/PIO
line that authorizes ASO to place SAIP orders against the
contract. Finally, ASO already has information on SAIP
ordering windows. Theoretically, ASO need only communicate
with the contractor to confirm the windows and coordinate
timing of the buy. Confirmation of the SAIP window would
always be required since procurement order release schedules
provided by contractors are planning data which are subject to
change
.
The procurement order release schedule process is
young. Initial efforts to prototype it (E-2C and F-18
programs) still required extensive coordination between ASO,
88
the contractor and NAVAIR. NAVAIR involvement may be ex-
plained by the fact that it was a NAVAIR process that was
being prototyped and fundamental questions of order release
schedule format and how to best match the listings to ASO's
requirements had to be resolved. It seems likely that further
prototyping efforts would result in a consensus on the best
resolution to these issues and greater systematization of this
phase of the process.
What is clearly disagreeable to weapon systems
managers is any process that involves time consuming efforts
beyond normal automated SDR processes to identify SAIP
candidates and opportunities. To date, the SAIP technique has
not interfaced very well with the automated processes that ASO
relies upon for determining the timing and quantity of spares
procurements, and, to varying degrees, the execution of those
procurements. As discussed in the previous chapter, this was
a common concern of research participants when discussing the
short comings of existing SAIP processes. Obviously, how well
a particular process addresses this issue has a bearing on its
palatability and likelihood of use.
2 . Questions of Funding and Changing Requirements
None of the current processes address two issues that
have proven particularly troublesome in implementing the SAIP
technique: availability of funding and changing requirements.
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The data presented in the previous chapter bear witness to how
these issues can complicate and impede implementation of SAIP.
Although availability of funding is not a problem
unique to SAIP its impact on a SAIP procurement may be greater
than other procurements . A SAIP procurement is extremely
sensitive to timing. Therefore, if funding is delayed, SAIP
windows may be missed and opportunities lost. When funding is
finally made available the spare will still be procured, but
at higher cost than if the window is met. Moreover, delays in
funding have a ripple affect that may affect the price other
customers (NAVAIR) pay for a part. If a contractor agrees to
a price based on a consolidated order quantity and ASO is
subsequently not able to pay for an order, then, depending on
the contract structure and stage of negotiations, either other
customers must pay more, or the contractor or one of the
customers is saddled with a termination liability. Availabil-
ity of funding is critical to successful implementation of the
SAIP technique and willingness of participants to enter into
future SAIP arrangements
.
Stability of requirements may be the greatest diffi-
culty and barrier to SAIP implementation. The experiences
related by research respondents reveal that havoc reigns when
pricing arrangements contingent upon consolidation of two
customer's orders are undermined by changing quantity require-
ments on the part of one or more customers. The affect on the
contract is the same as funding volatility. The problem of
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changing quantity requirements, though, may be more intracta-
ble than funding volatility.
Funding is always available. Where it is applied is
a matter of priority. Availability and stability of funding
for SAIP transactions, therefore, appears to be a matter of
management prerogative addressable within existing ASO
management structures and processes. It is, in short, within
ASO's current span of control. The same cannot be said for
the stability of quantity requirements.
As discussed in the preceding chapters of this study,
spares quantity determination is dependent on a number of
factors; some within ASO's control and some not. Factors
within ASO's control include EOQ model factors such as
endurance level/stockage objective and reorder point, and
decisions regarding quantity adjustment or timing of replen-
ishment actions (e.g., advancing\delaying them or changing
quantities in response to funding priorities or SAIP opportu-
nities) . However, ASO does not control system demand. It
has already been pointed out that demand can fluctuate in
response to changing operational tempo or environment,
inventory adjustments, ECPs, seasonal demand, etc. All of
these factors are beyond ASO's immediate control. Common
sense would lead to the conclusion, that the longer a part is
ordered before projected need, the greater the chance that
changing demand will drive a change in the required quantity.
If fluctuating demand results in an increased quantity
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requirement, it is not likely to have a negative impact on a
SAIP transaction, but as discussed above, a reduced quantity-
will almost certainly have a negative impact on a SAIP
transaction.
The "wise" decision in such circumstances might be to
maintain the original SAIP order quantity and temporarily
exceed system stockage objectives with less expensive parts.
However, pressure from external agencies exercising oversight
of ASO operations can make such a decision politically
untenable or, at least, uncomfortable. That is, a weapon
systems manager might choose to spend more money for a part
rather than be taken to task by GAO for ordering excess
quantities. As Dr. Perry pointed out, current ICP EOQ models
do not make provision for flexible stockage objectives or a
range of objectives based on varying price levels.
If a SAIP procurement is to executed smoothly and
successfully, individual customers must not reduce order
quantities after a price has been agreed upon. Even if a
particular SAIP action survives such a perturbation, it
injects difficulty and "pain" into the transaction that will
discourage participants from seeking to enter into future SAIP
arrangements. Unfortunately, the inability of current systems
to accommodate SAIP ordering windows by computing stable
replenishment requirements before system inventories are
depleted to established reorder points may stand as an
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institutional barrier to broader application of the SAIP
technique.
E. WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE?
With consideration of what has and has not worked well in
SAIP implementation, effort can be directed to developing an
improved transactional model that will encourage more frequent
consideration of SAIP. Such a model should simplify the
process of identifying SAIP candidates and coordinating the
timing and execution of the purchase action. Additionally, in
order to ensure that as many opportunities as possible are
considered, the model should not limit consideration of SAIP
to production end items or to particular customers.
The procurement order release scheduled process modeled by
NAVAIR seeks to achieve many of these goals. The process
provides- for up- front identification of procurement order
release schedules, it seeks to take advantage of existing ADP
capabilities to perform initial screening steps, and it
provides an existing contractual instrument against which to
place SAIP orders which should expedite the process. However,
apparently in deference to contractor concerns, it does not
dictate a specific format for procurement release order
schedules, and it limits SAIP actions to current NAVAIR
contractors. The NAVAIR process does, though, provide an
excellent basis for developing a more systematic ASO model.
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Despite contractor's concerns about program cost growth,
allowing contractors to submit procurement order release
schedules if their own format may place some undesirable
constraints on the process. If the process is to be "system-
atized, " input data should be provided in a standardized
format. For instance, if procurement release order schedules
are to be electronically matched to ASO's database on a
routine basis, ASO ADP system managers would most likely
choose to rely on a utility program, possibly locally devel-
oped, to match input data to the ASO databases such as the
stratification file and files of in process procurement
actions. Such a utility program would require input data to
be in a consistent, standardized format. If data was not
received from contractors in that format, effort would have to
be expended to reformat it (hopefully, it would contain all
required data elements) , before a match could be processed.
[Ref. 40]
Additionally, the Navy is rapidly embracing electronic
data interchange (EDI) as a means to improve quality and
reduce the cost of operations [Ref. 41:p. 1-1]. While
exchanging floppy discs with procurement release schedule data
might be desirable for prototyping this SAIP process, it would
seem wise to take advantage of EDI capabilities extant at both
ASO and contractor's facilities to pass this sort of data in
the future. Once established, an EDI route for exchanging
this information would lead to greater systematization and
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speed the process, since it would reduce "off-line" manipula-
tion and reformatting of the data . Conversations with the
NAVSUP EDI Program Management Office indicate that the minimal
amount of information required for this type of matching
process might be easily accommodated by modifying an existing
EDI transaction set [Ref . 42] . Which transaction set would be
the most appropriate can best be determined between NAVSUP and
ASO EDI managers once the matching process has been success-
fully prototyped. Taking advantage of EDI, though, obviously
requires a consistent data format.
Including a CDRL and DID specifying the data format and
exchange medium in any contract with a SAIP clause, and paying
a fair price for this deliverable, would probably overcome
contractor hesitancy to provide the data. Contract language,
though, would most likely have to acknowledge that such data
was planning data and subject to change. Conversations with
one contractor that participated extensively in prototyping
the NAVAIR process indicated that they would be receptive to
this approach.
The NAVAIR provision allowing ASO to place SAIP orders
directly with the contractor against a NAVAIR contract tends
to confirm the notion that coordination with the contractor
and his procurement order release dates, rather than coordina-
tion with NAVAIR, is the key to a successful SAIP effort. The
next logical step along this line of reasoning would seem to
be that it should not be necessary to rely on a NAVAIR
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contract with a SAIP clause to execute a SAIP transaction. If
ASO BOA's and/or long term contracts contained a SAIP clause
similar to that developed by NAVAIR, ASO could conceivably
expand the potential contractor base for SAIP. Including the
SAIP clause in ASO contractual instruments might also help to
clarify the issue of termination liability.
If ASO places a SAIP order against a NAVAIR contract and
a price is negotiated based on the resulting larger production
quantity, a subsequent cancellation by ASO may result in
NAVAIR incurring the termination liability or, at least, in
protracted "negotiations" between NAVAIR and ASO over the
liability. If a contractor voluntarily priced an order based
on a larger quantity, and ASO subsequently canceled, then the
contractor would be left with the liability. On the other
hand, a SAIP clause in ASO's BOA's or contracts stating that
the pricing methodology was contingent on larger production
runs as a result of ASO meeting SAIP windows specified by the
contractor would seem to place termination liability squarely
on ASO's shoulders. The advantage of this situation, is that
the reduced risk for both the contractor and NAVAIR (or some
other customer) might encourage more willing participation in
the SAIP process.
This model allows ASO to execute SAIP procurements without
the requirement for coordination with NAVAIR. It does not,
however, preclude coordination with NAVAIR if other consider-
ations, such as reducing the percentage of non- competitive
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contract actions, make it desirable to consolidate require-
ments on one contract. Also, this model is not expected to
supplant the ad- hoc process. Weapon systems managers and item
managers interested in providing optimal support for their
systems will continue to maintain a close liaison with their
APML counterparts and "serendipitous" SAIP opportunities will
continue to present themselves. Since these opportunities are
apt to be for the largest, high money value items that receive
special attention, it may be that the greatest SAIP payoffs
will always arise as a result of the ad-hoc process.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding chapter analyzed the data obtained from the
research effort with respect to Naval aviation and the issues
discussed in Chapter III (Background) . With that analysis
completed, this chapter will present some specific conclusions
on SAIP as it applies to Naval aviation and some recommenda-
tions on application of the technique.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. SAIP is a Valid Technique
The first conclusion to be drawn from this research is
that SAIP is a valid technique for saving money in Naval
aviation spares acquisition. Whether relying on attempts to
estimate savings or "taking it on faith" that the technique
must generate savings, this was the one point of nearly
universal agreement in this research effort.
Savings are generated by economies of scale resulting
from larger production runs for a given item. These economies
of scale include learning curve effects, savings from larger
contractor material orders, and allocating overhead costs over
a larger production base. The most substantial savings are
generated when orders can be combined early enough for
contractors to include them on their material orders. Other
savings may result from avoiding redundant setup costs and
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reduced contract administration costs (in the latter case,
only if orders are combined on one contract)
.
2. Lower Unit Price is the Only Promise
Though other benefits have been postulated for the
SAIP concept, there is no clear evidence or unassailable
rationale to support such claims. The SAIP concept was
originated in the interest of saving money, and organizations
considering the SAIP technique, should do so only if achieving
price savings is there primary goal. Configuration control,
readiness, and price visibility are goals that can be achieved
with or without a SAIP pricing agreement as long as they are
addressed with appropriate contractual tasking.
3 . The Current Definition is Too Narrow
Existing definitions of SAIP are too narrow in their
characterization of the technique. The operative mechanism
for achieving the only proper goal of SAIP: cost/unit price
reduction, is the economies of scale which result from
contemporaneous placement of two or more customer orders with
a given supplier. Integrating a spares order with a produc-
tion order for an identical end item is only one of a number
of options that may be pursued to that same end. A definition
that ties such savings to production end items only, may
implicitly limit consideration of a larger universe of
alternatives such as consolidating spares orders with other
customers' spares orders, or other customers' orders for items
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that require similar materials or processes. The term "Spares
Acquisition Integrated with Production, " is, itself, an
obstacle to an appropriate characterization of this savings
technique. SPCC's term for the process, Timely Spares
Provisioning (TSP)
,
may be an improvement over SAIP, but it is
not very descriptive of the process. A term such as Concur-
rent Customer Contracting (CCC or C3 ) , on the other hand,
would not prejudice a definition that properly characterizes
the process : A procurement technique for achieving unit price
reductions which emphasizes placing orders concurrently with
other customers, for items which require the same, or similar,
materials or processes, to achieve larger production runs and
economies of scale.
Although most C3 ASO procurements will most likely be
executed concurrently with NAVAIR production requirements, a
revised definition might foster broader consideration of
alternatives.
4. There is No Conflict With Other Procurement Objectives
As defined in this thesis, the C3 technique does not
conflict with other procurement objectives. Placing orders
concurrently with other customers to achieve larger production
lots does not prohibit competition or breakout. However, C3
is most appropriate, and will normally be used, in situations
where competition cannot be obtained. Additionally, the
intricacy and sensitivity of the competitive award process
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may, in fact, make it unwise to attempt to implement C3 in any-
such procurement action. Finally, in those rare instances
where estimated C 3 savings far outweigh estimated savings from
competition, a J&A should resolve any possible conflict.
5. Potential Exists for Wider Application and Savings
A potential exists for wider application of the C3
technique. This conclusion is not based on a discovery of
untapped C 3 sources. A search for such opportunities was
beyond the scope of this project. Rather, this conclusion is
based on a finding that existing C3 processes discussed in
this thesis are limited in their ability to uncover such
opportunities. The possibility of untapped opportunities
simply cannot be rejected until a more systematic, and less
burdensome process is developed for exploring C 3 opportuni-
ties. This conclusion is also consistent with statements made
by research respondents in both Government and industry that
many C3 opportunities are missed.
6. Current Processes Limit Consideration of Options
Analysis of the data obtained during this research
effort makes it clear that current processes limit consider-
ation of options because:
They are time consuming, difficult, and frustrating to
coordinate thereby discouraging a routine search for and
consideration of C 3 options.
They do not provide a routine and systematic mechanism for
contractors to notify the Government of C 3 opportunities.
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• They do not address the problem of computing reliable
spares requirement quantities before inventories are
depleted to the reorder point and item managers are
notified by a SDR.
Modifications to existing processes may mitigate some
of these shortcomings, but no process is likely to eliminate
them. More flexible EOQ models may allow easier computation
of required quantities and adjusted inventory stockage
objectives based on contractor price breaks for various
quantity ranges. However, contractor's procurement order
release dates will always be subject to change, and demand for
spares will continue to fluctuate requiring customers to
adjust their quantities or drop the requirement entirely.
Concurrent timing of procurements, therefore, will always
require an extra measure of effort and coordination.
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Base on the background study, research data, and analysis
the research questions posed at the beginning of the study may
now be answered. The subsidiary questions will be answered
first followed by the primary research question.
1. Subsidiary Question No. 1
What is the SAIP concept and what are the presumed
benefits of the concept?
SAIP or, preferably, Concurrent Customer Contracting,
is a procurement technique for achieving unit price reductions
which emphasizes placing orders concurrently with other
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customers, for items which require the same, or similar,
materials or processes, in order to achieve larger production
runs and economies of scale.
The primary benefit of the process is the opportunity
to obtain substantial price savings, particularly for items
with limited competitive potential. Other benefits, such as
improved configuration control, and reduced administrative
burden may be concomitant to the technique depending on
contract methodology and language, but these benefits cannot
be assured in the absence of specific actions, beyond concur-
rent order placement, to achieve those benefits.
2. Subsidiary Question No. 2
To what extent have the presumed benefits of the SAIP
concept been realized in historical application of the
concept?
The primary benefit of unit price reduction has been
realized to some extent every time the technique has been
employed. This statement is based on historical estimates of
C3 savings reported to NAVSUP and the universally accepted
theorem that larger production runs invariably return econo-
mies to scale which result in unit cost reductions. Though
not always quantifiable, C3 savings are an "article of faith."
3. Subsidiary Question No. 3
What factors have been critical to the success or
failure of SAIP?
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Factors critical to success of the technique include
knowledge of other customer purchases or contractors' procure-
ment order release schedules, timing of orders to meet those
procurement order release schedules, the ability to determine
stable required spares quantities, and availability of
funding. Factors likely to result in failure are inability to
place orders early enough to meet procurement order release
dates, unstable requirements, lack of funding, and ineffi-
cient, unwieldy processes that discourage investigation of C3
opportunities
.
4. Subsidiary Question No. 4
What are the key issues that must be addressed or
resolved in applying the SAIP concept to spares procurement
for Naval aviation weapon systems?
The key issues that must be addressed or resolved
include establishing appropriate selection criteria for C3
candidates, developing processes that facilitate the search
for C 3 opportunities and integrating those processes into
standard automated inventory management systems, and estab-
lishing contractual vehicles that allow rapid exploitation of
C3 opportunities when they arise. Developing more flexible
EOQ models, though not critical to applying C3 techniques,
would also facilitate the process and possibly broaden
opportunities by allowing adjustment of inventory stockage
objectives to take full advantage of price/quantity breaks.
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5. Subsidiary Question No. 5
To what extent should the SAIP concept be applied to
spares procurement for Naval aviation weapon systems and how
can it best be implemented to optimize program results?
Concurrent Customer Contracting techniques should be
applied to Naval aviation weapon systems whenever a non-
competitive contracting environment exists, the estimated
extended money value of the requirement is relatively large,
and C3 opportunities can be identified. System demand for the
C3 candidate should be stable, and funding should be assured.
The technique can best be implemented within a process
that emphasizes coordination with the contractor rather than
the contractor's other customers. The contractor should
notify the Government of his C3 windows, preferably via EDI
processes. The Government should, in turn, rely on automated
processes to the maximum extent possible to accomplish the
time consuming front -end screening efforts required to
determine that a spares requirement exists and that an order
may be placed in time to meet the C3 window.
6. Primary Research Question
What are the essential characteristics of the Spares
Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP) concept and what
factors are critical to successful application of the concept
to spares procurement for Naval aviation weapon systems?
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The essential characteristics of the SAIP concept are
concurrent placement of orders by two or more customers in a
non- competitive environment for items requiring similar
materials or processes in order to achieve larger production
runs and economies of scale. SAIP is better characterized as
a Concurrent Customer Contracting technique.
The factors critical to successful application of the
of the technique are efficient contractor/Government communi-
cation channels and a cooperative environment that promote
timely identification of C3 opportunities and rapid exploita-
tion of those opportunities. Item configuration, demand, and
funding must all be stable.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. A New Term and A New Definition
The Navy and DoD should adopt a more accurate and
descriptive term for the "SAIP" technique and a definition
that encourages broader consideration of savings alternatives.
Concurrent Customer Contracting (C3 ) is offered as an alterna-
tive term with the following definition.
Concurrent Customer Contracting: A procurement technique
for achieving unit price reductions which emphasizes
placing orders concurrently with other customers, for
items which require the same, or similar, materials or
processes, in order to achieve larger production runs and
economies of scale.
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2. A Model for More Systematic Application
a. General Recommendation
It is recommended that the Aviation Supply Office
prototype a modified C3 process to address the limitations of
the current processes. The prototype process should make
maximum use of available technology to reduce the level of
effort involved in searching for C3 opportunities. Specifi-
cally, ASO should:
• Build on the process already prototyped between NAVAIR,
ASO and contractors as reflected in NAVAIR Air- 02 Policy
and Procedures Memorandum #150A (Appendix C)
.
• Incorporate C3 clauses in BOAs and long term contracts
which request contractors to provide procurement order
release schedules on a periodic basis and in a specified
format
.
• Emphasize use of EDI for transmission of contractor
procurement order release schedules to ASO.
• Rely- on an automated, front -end screening process at ASO
to match contractor procurement schedules to the ASO
database.
• Rely on stratification listings of matched items that meet
additional estimated total cost and projected purchase
date parameters specified by ASO. These additional
screening parameters will serve to reduce the candidate
list to manageable proportions and restrict it to items
likely to have the greatest payoff (e.g., starting at
total estimated dollar value equal to or greater than
$500K)
• Encourage contractors to provide procurement order release
schedules for any customer's requirements, rather than
just NAVAIR production contracts.
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b. Building on the NAVAIR Process
As discussed previously, the NAVAIR model provides
a good starting point for developing a more systematic
process, but modifications should be made to the NAVAIR model
to facilitate automated screening for C3 candidates. A
standard format should be developed for contractors to use in
notifying ASO of procurement order release dates. At a
minimum the contractor should provide NSNs (or FSCM and part
number) of production items for which material orders are
planned during the current fiscal year, the dates by which the
contractor must have ASO's requirements for those NSNs (or
items that require similar materials or processes 8 ) , and the
system or next higher assembly for which the item is being
produced. DID DI-V-7200 referenced in the NAVAIR model
already exists to provide this type of information for SAIP
transactions, but it does not specify an electronic format.
DI-V-7200 does, though, rely on the LSAR format for providing
SAIP information, and ASO is currently involved in efforts to
specify an EDI transaction set for exchanging LSA information
with contractors [Ref. 41:p. 3-4]. It is recommended that,
since LSAR data provides the information required for consid-
eration of C3 candidates, any LSA EDI transaction set be
Contractors might be in a better position than ASO to
determine which ASO managed items require similar materials or
processes. If concurrent production of such items would result in
cost savings, contractors could seize the marketing opportunity to
offer such items on the C3 list provided to ASO.
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developed with consideration for its optional use as a means
of notifying the government of C3 ordering windows
.
Besides the minimal information discussed above,
ASO could also request that contractors identify the contract-
ing office and contract number for which production is
planned. This information would allow ASO to decide whether
to coordinate directly with the contractor or with the other
ordering office to execute a concurrent order if it is
determined that a C3 procurement would be beneficial.
c. Incorporate C3 Clauses in ASO Contracts
Incorporating C3 clauses in BOAs and long term
contracts, would, as previously discussed, allow ASO to
rapidly exploit C3 opportunities by coordinating directly with
the contractor rather than another Government contracting
office. C3 clauses should state that the contractor agrees to
combine material orders to achieve economic order quantities
whenever ASO meets C3 ordering windows provided by the
contractor and that savings resulting from the economic order
quantities will be reflected in the price of the order. If
prices have already been definitized in the BOAs or contracts,
SAIP clauses should contain, or refer to, an agreed upon
discount schedule based on various quantity breaks. Quanti-
ty/price breaks might be reflected in the C3 ordering window
lists (procurement order release dates) provided by contrac-
tors (LSAR format) or in the contract CLINs for specific
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items. However, the C3 clause should make it clear that the
sum of all concurrent customer orders, not just ASO's order,
will be used for determining the quantity break and appropri-
ate price.
C3 clauses should require contractors to provide C3
ordering window lists on a periodic basis. The frequency of
submission could be a topic of negotiation, but twice a year,
in time to allow concurrent processing with ASO's requirements
stratification, would seem to be an appropriate schedule. C3
clauses should also acknowledge that the C3 ordering window
lists are planning data only and that they must be verified by
the ordering officer (PCO or ACO) prior to order placement.
d. Emphasize Use of EDI.
Although this process may be prototyped with a few
contractors using hard- copy listings or floppy disks, the
ultimate goal should be to rely on EDI for the transmission of
C3 ordering window lists. Relying on EDI will ensure that
this "systematized" process will be compliant with the intent
of DMRD 941: acceleration of DoD's use of EDI [Ref. 41:p. 1-
1] . Relying on EDI will also encourage refinement of the
process to use existing contractor/government EDI systems and
transaction sets and thereby avoid burdening the contractor
with developing and maintaining a separate system for gather-
ing and transmitting C3 data to ASO. Finally, as stated
above, relying on EDI will ensure that information provided by
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contractors will be in a standard, electronic format that will
facilitate automated, front -end screening efforts at ASO.
e. Rely on an Automated, Front-End Screening Process
Providing C3 ordering window listings to weapon
systems managers or item managers without further refinement
of the lists will not encourage systematic consideration of
C3 . ASO should take advantage of automated data processing
capabilities to perform front -end screening of contractor
provided listings. Local utility programs should be developed
to match data provided by contractors in standard electronic
formats (preferably EDI compliant) to ASO databases to select
the most promising C3 candidates for management review. It is
recommended that these utilities match C3 candidates to files
of open procurement actions and stratification files produced
from the biannual requirements stratification process. This
matching step would ensure that managers would only be
required to review items with quantifiable requirements within
periods covered by the stratification process. An additional
selection parameter based on estimated prices which exceed a
given threshold should be used to ensure efforts are initially
expended on high cost procurements which are likely to have
the highest C3 payoff. $500,000 is suggested as an arbitrary
starting point. The price threshold should be adjusted up or
down as experienced is gained with the process and assessments
ill




Concurrent Contracting with Other Customers
ASO should encourage contractors to include items
being ordered by customers other than NAVAIR on C3 ordering
window lists provided to ASO. Contractors are probably in the
best position to determine if items they are producing for
other customers require materials or processes similar to
items that are listed on ASO BOAs or contracts. Although
contractors can be expected to incur some additional costs in
making such determinations, this option provides them a
marketing opportunity for encouraging ASO to order earlier
and/or in larger quantities than might otherwise be the case.
Enlightened pricing strategies should allow contractors to
share in the cost benefits of economic order quantities. The
objective should be to create a win- win situation that
encourages enthusiastic participation of both industry and
Government in the C3 technique.
g. A Final Word on the Model
This revised transactional model should mitigate
the difficulties involved in investigating C3 opportunities
and allow more systematic application of the technique. It
will not, however, alleviate difficulties involved in deter-
mining accurate required spares quantities outside of the
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normal SDR process or quantity changes driven by demand and
inventory fluctuations beyond ASO's control.
Finally, it is recommended that ASO and NAVAIR review
existing processes to determine which add value to the SAIP
effort and which have yielded negligible payoffs. Specifi-
cally, the draft RFP and PRMIS database processes should be
evaluated to determine if they should have a place in a more
systematic model.
3. C3 Selection Criteria
To ensure the greatest possible return on investment,
ASO and NAVAIR should restrict application of concurrent
customer contracting techniques to items meeting the following
criteria:
• Non- competitive procurements.
• For high cost WRAs and SRAs (or high estimated procurement
EMV) .
• With steady, predictable demand.
• And assured funds availability.
"High cost" in this context has a floating definition. The
prototype process should set an arbitrary threshold on
procurement EMV ($500,000) under which concurrent contracting
opportunities would not be pursued. The threshold would
ensure that listings would be produced only for items with a
high potential payoff and would keep listings to a manageable
size. The threshold should be lowered or raised depending on
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the success and level of difficulty involved in implementing
a revised process.
There are no absolutes in the area of concurrent
customer contracting. Savings are where you can find them.
But considering the level of effort usually expended in
implementing the technique, and that more than one customer is
involved, it is prudent to concentrate on the items that are
likely to have the highest payoff and the lowest chance of
serious complication due to demand fluctuation or lack of
funding
.
4 . Estimating Savings
It is recommended that estimates of savings from
implementation of the C3 technique be based on the difference
in the definitized price of a C3 procurement as compared to
the lowest historical price of a non-C3 procurement for
similar quantities of identical items adjusted for inflation.
If such historical data is not available, savings may be based
on contractor estimates of prices for lower production
quantities
.
Since it is difficult to reliably determine C
savings, especially before prices are definitized, great
caution should be exercised in relying on such estimates to
justify a non- competitive procurement. The estimates should
be relied upon solely to gather statistical evidence of
savings efforts in sole source situations.
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Targets or goals for C 3 savings should not be estab-
lished. Estimates in that case would be developed to satisfy
the goals. Additionally, since the accuracy of any estimate
would be questionable, significant resources should not be
devoted to determining C3 savings on an individual procure-
ment. Attempting to estimate C3 savings is only justified in
so far as such information is required to assess the
advisability of investing resources to improve the efficiency
of the technique and broaden its application.
C3 savings are common sense and an article of faith. The
technique needs no further justification. The technique
should be used in sole source situations whenever it can be
implemented with a reasonable level of effort in consideration
of the likely payoff and its competitive demand for management
time and its disruptive influence on more orderly processes





Name of your Command or Activity:
Your Name
:
Your office or section:
Your position:
Number of years in your current position:




Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on
which the SAIP technique was used.
2. DoD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DoD Inst 5000.2) listed
three criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed
any added administrative costs. In general, this
limits application of SAIP to repairable items and
selected high- cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that suffi-
cient quantities are not available within the required
delivery period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to
these criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candi-
dates?) .
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch- as -catch- can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for produc-
tion items and spares? Please describe any problems this
causes
.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of
the technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
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6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the
provisioning process than you normally would? What problems
does this cause? For example, is there an increased risk of
obsolescence due to unstable design, inadequate demand data,
etc.?
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM,
ARROWS, etc.)? Does SAIP require you to use different models
for determining spares quantities than you would normally use?
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one
choice below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion
for each arrangement)
a. at the same time and on the same contract as
production buys?
b. at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
c. through the prime contractor or with the prime's
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP tech-
nique with:
a. The prime contractor
b. The prime's vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why?
10. How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP
effort and how accurate do you believe those estimates are
(Quite accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP
conflict with (Breakout, Competition, Socio- Economic goals)
and, how have you resolved these conflicts?
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsoles-
cence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness,
etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the risks?
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any
historical files, data, documents, or directives that would
support information you provided above or that might be
otherwise helpful. If so please list some examples. Is it
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possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to
make an on- sight visit to collect them?
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors
that you think would be able and willing to provide informa-
tion for this research project. If so, please provide
addresses, phone numbers and points of contact. Thank you.
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.
I have had no direct experience with SAIP , i.e.,
incorporating secondary item requirements within the major item
contract. However, the various Acquisition Center offices
coordinate extensively to ensure that the pricing benefits which
are the objective of SAIP are obtained to the extent possible





3. Being assigned to a major system for the majority of my
career, I have no specific knowledge about how SAIP is handled by
the requirements offices. However, when the Acquisition Center
receives a requirement for secondary item procurement from the
prime contractor, either the prime will incorporate that
requirement in purchase orders placed in support of the major
item and/or the Acquisition Center contracting and pricing
offices work closely together to ensure economies of scale are
obtained to the extent possible.
4. Not applicable.
5. If "replenishment spares" is defined as low cost, high demand
secondary item requirements, I believe that SAIP may not be
appropriate. Of primary consideration would be the competitive
nature of the item. The prime contractor would conduct its
competitive buy, but the government would then have to pay the
prime contractor's profit; a comparison of this cost would have
to be made against the government's expense of conducting the
acquisition. In many instances, such items are purchased in lot
quantities and any savings generated by the SAIP concept could be
minimal, especially considering prime contractor profit and




8. This office has never incorporated Spares requirements in its
major item contracts. Spares requirements are used in
negotiating overhead rates and, when possible, incorporated by
the prime contractor in its purchase orders place in support of
the major item. When asked, the prime contractor will identify
its supplier to the government.
9. Not having any SAIP experience, I would think that the best
technique would be utilizing the vendors/suppliers if possible.
This would save the cost of the prime's markups; which would have
to be balanced with the cost of the government's acquisition
process of the item(s) in question.
10. Not applicable.
11. Depending on the secondary requirement, SAIP may conflict
with the listed goals. I have not incorporated secondary
requirements in the major item contract, so I have no experience
in such resolution.
12. I would think that the three major risks/costs would be a)
the cost of the prime's markups; b) conflict with the procurement
objectives mentioned in paragraph 11; and c) PALT (with a sole
source contractor on a major system). I wouldn't think that a
general statement could be made regarding benefits outweighing
the risks - it would have to depend on the secondary item(s) in
question
.
13. Not having implemented SAIP, no.
14. No. I am not aware of any SAIP acquisition activity
currently taking place.
General Comments:
My contracting experience has been with the Abrams Tank for
the last 9 years and my comments are based on that experience.
Contracting for the Abrams Tank requires placement of a contract
for Long Lead Material (LLM) approximately 24 months prior to
first vehicle delivery. Not only is it difficult to determine
tank requirements this far in advance, I would imagine that
spares requirements may be even more difficult to determine.
Because of the requirements turbulence which occurs between
LLM award and final determination, the prime contractor often
includes Option requirements in purchase orders. In the event
these option requirements are not needed to support production,
the prime contractor may use them to satisfy spares requirements.
Likewise, if the prime contractor has a spares requirement which
he can include with a production requirement, it does so.
Date: /'S *J/9'v 9^ ^- ^
Name of your Command or Activity: rft///077*'*' J
c/r**' r/C£,
Your Name:
Your office or section:
Your position:
Number of years in your current position: ^
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: <2/
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SATP technique was used.
/4 r/94'Cfy *f /as */>/*•"*o c/?*" /9'Ag4X¥Z
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?)
.
JT 2>o "Js &Ct/£t/c *7//*T 77Y*rc /sjdW/$f/4Cf
//CA-C /9T /?So tufa <7A/6s*>*7c -7MC /4&?e~ 7*
CC^P/^C y/Al/LZS W*T *s'7U 7>A'i*c77*~ U^fW
//**£ T#C iutfc*r'Cv 'T/M <- 7* 2*£7tA"9"**y CE*Vul^^
» &A»\erT *>*y77A
/* AcuC* c?~7~S">a7£ <*f J*- r T*>s /r A**egss*4S
s\>
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.) .
/l//1P>1//L~ /^'fcTceSj Are>o6e~fc^, £"-*&/" l*Jt~c/o*/Ss
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
£C
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS,
etc.)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
J/}//* a&*>f yty^ Ccur^ 7fci S/icre. s»cf< 7* fi<^
/DatAtx?? //* <z^S//reiy A/c*j' /vied/*+"X<?c\
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for each
arrangement)
fijM j£lJ at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
b. at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
.
+,.-- , u ...j^^/c/ through the prime contractor or with the prime's
/Cs suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
^/? /'jp at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
j "^^prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
a. The prime contractor
b. The prime's vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
&*rfr /+> .'fife. Ar*9rc*»~ As/*" /£'{*- /4/t#pAi<*^r *re t/fuc//y /%<;</&.
10- How do you normally estimate tne savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate do you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
4r /J /wy /i/if/i <?f e^r^-f/fO
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
41 .'12/93 07:34 ©40$ 646 2138 NTS Code 36
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
44k ??
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers
and points of contact. Thank you.
/* 7
6
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Date: 19 January 1993
Name of your Command or Activity; Navy aso
Your Name:
Your office or section:
Your position:
Number of years in your current position:
1 yr
.
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: 21
Phone number: (215)
I* Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAXP technique was used.
SH-60 A/C
2- DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?) .
High cost repairables (WRAs) and high cost SRA's.
01-1293 07:33 ©408 646 2138 NTS Code 36
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter*
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
Verbal communication by phone or meeting and with great difficulty.
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production i
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
Yes
When ready to award, both funds are not available. Delays result as
does possible splitting of requirement.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique" ' to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
Yes.
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
Not necessarily. Generally SAIP can be done with later production runs.
ASO would not manage the item until design had stabilized.
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS,
etc-)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
No.
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for each
arrangement)
a^ at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
on buysK
at same -time as production buys but on different
ntracts?
^cJ through the prime contractor or with the prime's
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
(d) at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
All of the above have been used at one time or another.
011293 07:34 ©408 646 2138 NTS Code 36
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with: n
a. The prime contractor
b. The prime* s vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why. DCAs will provide much lower pricing as there is no markup, but with
much more difficulty coordinating the requirements.
Prime Contractor is much easier to manage but at substantially higher c
10. How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate do you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
If available, based on stand alone proposals. Sometimes based on stand
alone quote from contractor. If neither available, buy estimate.
Probably in the ball park.
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
None. SAIP isn't used to preclude competition or breakout. SAIP
is generally when item is sole source so no impact on source economic
goals.
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
Benefits outweigh risks (savings outweigh the fact that its hard)
Costs - time
Administrative effort.
JX 12'93 07:34 ©408 646 2138 NTS Code 36 ©007
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers
and points of contact. Thank you.
01.-12.-93 07:33 ©408 646 2138 XPS Code 36 ill-
Date: 1/Z2/93
Name of your Command or Activity: A/A ML- ^,4r/t>AJ <S«pni ^/="/vc£
Your Name:
Your office or section:
Your position: S^ppL/ SysTMS /}A>At.ys7'
Number of years in your current position: 2.
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: 1 5"
Phone number:
1* Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
/-tS3 $e-#AJ2o x
/?AJ/c/>y- /5*2.
^Z-J3 7ZWIK /AjT<r/Lp#cf Mats
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAXP candidates?)
.
/to. % TttJ/tK An J at/rexj* AAf V/A-St? w*1*'" £*#* /!>?*/<»
SocoAt? of }€»**&, SrsZcf 2>^j^ y A/fux/L <Si*K»*s ^v/rM MW "*%
Dl 12 93 07:33 ©408 646 2138 XPS Code 36 |£004
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
AcrwnfJ (A>+ira/A^ ?*/*<? e<>~rA4<.ToAs jnrc) *a 6A*fA^ ^//^*«r *a &xaS*~c
7%*4A*A7S ~T#f £*>fA/*«S />J4A>4f£AS C**> /?<*fSS cA /J*Ai> C*Sf A&-ATS.
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
** T»f &P„iA€He^r *» A?v„ce C.sr >a S/uass At 71c S^e fa
01-12 93 07:33 ©408 646 2138 NPS Code 36
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACM, ARROWS,
etc-)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
8* Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for each
arrangement)
** (S? at t&e same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
b, at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
/u ¥• 1* (§5 through the prime contractor or with the prime*
s
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
2(3v at "til© same time with suppliers/vendors that the
f* ' prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
112 93 07:34 ©408 646 2138 NTS Code 36 ®006
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
a. The prime contractor
b. The prime's vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why?
10. How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate do you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless) •
*i sr**> »c„e 7auf *,»** C>»>,»n> <p«*~r,rt *«cr,*,a> /V &*P ?*•<*. **" ,J
2>?/>r«.$rKT sm o&r*,*,^ 4 Jr4t^ 4cMg fr^ /k^ *£$ g^ter*. /f/sr.AJc4c
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
U»i-
fcTE^r/Ai- C*A,Pucr *»iru C**/>mrs*j~. x* *i cSt-f^ t>*/4/r»£X tAji&iuf
*- Xfs«cr /*/ c(ast C»i-r tfAsr Lf+prt^f teJf'oc A*r Z>'f****** £*+*'*&*.
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
A7»*(r/>A.y
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13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers
and points of contact. Thank you.
6
Date: V f&B $3
Name of your Command or Activity: £/&WM&tfl> Atf 6&&377&S e^r/TTZ7?.




Number of years in your current position: t^/Y^'
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: /?///£
Phone number
:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?) .
- 2
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
<rx$7&v S/fa6**» '***'** x&&W» M****x- 0* ^-^ j
ffetyuteo ^y »*'"* &**r**™f *?£7*w& **7*&**/
/ft/tM/f* SAG* &t**0&£ ^ ^61Z^~
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
/>s*sr />/fa$y<*r> /if*r&^ /***** ^^-^^.
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS,
etc.)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
hJftyMtof
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for each
arrangement
)
y^5»^a. at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
//C? y/*** a^ same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
ygz> c. through the prime contractor or with the prime 1 s
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
frC? d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
fi/# e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
(&} The prime contractor
b. The prime's vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why?o
10. How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate dp you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
^u^^ry/r)^^7^ —UJtiMfusss
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, Competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc*)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
yu jyod IDJ.U1 **
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
/\ro
14 . Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers




Name of your Command or Activity:
Your office or section:
Your position:
Number of years in your current position:
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field:
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
Scope S^rJtP rff mm**™
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 .(canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?)
.
£„ Cent***,*** WW"* ' c,r * r
'
, rsrfrS
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)"
{ho&^'dfr,<? C $Po
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
l{Q £S^/'ftvj* fan*'** Afc 'v,/i »
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
£i
/s K*T Tke SA>/° y**f, Mir, /2<tf*J '"*v
T^C TS<.(- " T*,,1>m£ S^'hJ«} Slyy> 6«."Y £<*Y.
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does thi
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence du
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
\j£$^ /HvyT'^A <f*T.< b^y ^^ 7
„ rl £SyJM+<-
'U.HflC l6 A^sy* V** &*/£
e^ **^M* Jester.
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use foi
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS;
etc.)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
A'
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for eaci
arrangement)
a. at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
b. at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
c. through the prime contractor or with the prime's
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
fiff't* C /
flioctor**
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
The prime contractor
The primers vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
^/fit-v G C *- •''«' £-'* Z^'- u
S*fe Crr/tG.Hi 7* I/******
10. How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate dp you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
fief* a ^ 6 ?°
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with .(Breakout, Competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
Uft'si Vb $^o
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
— a/7 r/^^/ ^ /
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
&U. ^ Sfd
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers




Name of your Command or Activity
Your office or section:
Your position: ^Xfi\UPn\€^f .OJ^Tf^f'^
Number of years in your currentfposition: X,x v7
: GMtfULjfOQIetkn BfS
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: /(^Js^D
Phone number: Jj&-<
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?).
i j
- 2
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your i i",
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares i sl
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for j J
a
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter- c
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
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4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
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5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
'S-', 'U-'-^-X
O. ;.. ... v., - ..-_ i -'-,-• - •-^ - J - c ^3 i]
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
_^_
1 c ^ 1 1 1 > f f(
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7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS,
etc.)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
-
-«. v— j <. >* u - . —-<— /
/ A . . •*.- .'- . _ . • »
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for each
arrangement) * j r ^ | \^XD V
Va. at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
b. at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
c. through the prime contractor or with the prime's
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
- c.
06.
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
l^ay The prime contractor
b. The prime *s vendors/suppliers (DCAs) . -jl
Why? J - ; v -,,.'r V ,, ; ;';•'.,' \'i
•' ^- . v..
10 . How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate dp you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless). •
r r. :-. v . f ' b r -• '" - is. - v~ v
b:. -^ilxji
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, Competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolvfed these conflicts?
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
1 Cr/'l
_
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13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers
and points of contact. Thank you.
6f0
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Date: 2? 0^^*5 3
Name of y6ur Command or Activity: fip** C.
Your office or section:
Your position : ' S<,^ f^si^
^^fp '\ ^f* <- Cfftutsfo* '*>$)
Number of years in your current position: 7. 3r
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: A*C
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs thai
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on whicl
the SAIP technique was used.
«<;.
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DQD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with, installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good Saip candidates?)
.
^AW s-H dLi tix.
01 26 '93 15::
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate saip buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-datch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
^
f+Jx^J L Jj-a- ^ Q^tesLjfc.w ^^«h»w4 SXjo*|jl Ma^tw
feo -fc ^cfe^^. -£fc^ 1~~^ b^-s PPQ,Q 4
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares? _






to unstable design, inadequate demand data,
etc.?
1
„... ^Al . coinDuter programs or formulas do you use for
!ng spare?quantities than you would normally use?
8 Do vou normally complete SAIP buys: (if »ore than
on* choice
b4lo^ap^iies?please Indicate a percentage proportion for eael
arrangemerit
)
a. at the same time and on the same contract
as produc-
tion ^V^
e tlBe as produci:ion buys but on differem
c!
ntr
toough the prima contractor or with the prime'.
suppliers/vendors (the OCAs)?
d, at the same time with suppliers/vendors that
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
-^^^ c+**ss=J*i* G^'U^ <L&«xSZiW
il 26- 93 15:28 ©006 007
*
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
T^> The prime contractor
The prise's vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why? 1^U__ *-&*&* cSL^^>^ q^^H^ ^-^V xk*^ f^,
10. Kow do you norma MTj~ estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate do you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, Competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
\-^JX^ n^j^cP^SLO^Afi> (r~*^ &.nra ...
^ A^-ila«^«.
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
*
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Date:
Name of your Command or Activity:
Your office or section:
Your position:
Number of years in your current position:
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field:
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
fotlpl-Vl-d-oo*^ J tfJ
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these







3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items* (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc*)
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design, inadequate demand data, etc.?
S7 jlj)-&s\J' -/)*ls}2*J '
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS,
etc.)? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for each
arrangemerit
)
a. at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
b. at same time as production buys but on different
j
contracts?
c. through the prime contractor or with the prime's
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
9. in your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
a. The prime contractor
b. The prime* s vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why?
10. Bow do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate do you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
.
11. What other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, Competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts?
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers
and points of contact. Thank you.
Date: 7 p^ 6 ^7 3
Name of your Command or Activity: A~p-|V\C_
Your office or sec"1- -
Your position:
, . . **<-, ^~ r\ ^Q <z~<^^-^ 1^ ^'
Number of years in your current position: <g (i^_j&
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field:
j ^-V"*^
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
Pc/MMcfc/vipg
2. DOD Inst 4245.12 .(canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAI? to repairable items and selected
high-cost consumables.
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
period through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?) .
3 . Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items . (Electronic Data Inter-
change, Standard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
4. On your contracts, are different funds cited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
5. Do you believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
U€JU -do w* z^^^-^fQA*^J^^
/\£%
6. Does SAIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there an increased risk of obsolescence due
to unstable design/ inadequate demand data, etc.?
.j^-ifc-JxL&urv^
•*«-&
7. What models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Mod-metric, ACIM, ARROWS,
etc. ) ? Does SAIP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys: (if more than one choice




at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
:ion buys? "
b. at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
c. through the prime contractor or with the prime's
suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe) .
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with:
5^^ The prime contractor
b. The prime* s vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
10. How do you normally estimate the savings from a SAIP effort
and how accurate dp you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless).
11. what other procurement objectives, if any, does SAIP conflict
with „(Breakout, Competition, Socio-Economic goals) and, how have
you resolved these conflicts? - ^ - J
^/»c^r. Fb'/Zfius-inZ & r r*p/i *isk«u^l proem
J?gfifingJ - fly r*s*foe. T&*~ c^^f/^-f * £ 7i
12. What do you feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PAJLT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the




Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to
me, or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
6* t^s^c/ e>*> psojf******
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers
and points of contact. Thank you.
6
„- j^-yj Or. Jl'.-~. :
Date: 25 JAN 93
Name of your command or Aotivity:
Your office or section?
Your position:' Supply Specialist (Provisioning)
Number of years in your current position: 7
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: I3
Phone number: 912-
WMHM——6S58 I B I lliB.ffl
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on which
the SAIP technique was used.
JOINT STARS
2. dod Inst 4245,12. (canceled by DOD Inst 5000.2) listed three
criteria to be met when considering SAIP procurement:
a. Economies of scale achieved by combining spares
orders with installation orders substantially exceed any
added administrative costs. In general, this limits
application of SAIP to repairable items and selected
high-costrconsumables
•
b. The item has been screened to ensure that sufficient
quantities are not available within the required delivery
perioJ through normal supply channels.
c. Risk of obsolescence is manageable.
Do you think there should be any additions or deletions to these
criteria (What type of items make good SAIP candidates?) .
m
09:30AM FROM
3. Please provide a brief explanation of how offices in your
activity that are responsible for determining/ordering spares
requirements coordinate SAIP buys with offices responsible for
contracting for production end items. (Electronic Data Inter-
change, st&ndard Operating Procedure for screening all spares,
catch-as-catch-can, notification of ordering windows, etc.)
The contractor provides a SAIP candidate list for the government hs review*
The government reviews and concurs/nonconcurs in the contractor 1^
recommendations. Items which are selected by the fovernment is submitted
by the contractor via an magnetic tape. Items are screened for existing
National Stock Numbers and provided to the appropriate equipment specialist
for the assignment of SMB. codes and failure rates. The info is then
forwarded to the Item Manager for computation. The orders are then
placed on contract usin«*the SAIP window provided by the contractor*
4« On yoiJr contrasts, are different funds oited for production
items and spares? Please describe any problems this causes.
There are line items for spares, both expense and investment
on the production contract. There are not separate line items for
SAIP; however, the Provisioned Item Order is stamped "SAIP"*
^^
5. Do yoU believe SAIP is an appropriate technique to use for
replenishment spares? If not, can you suggest variations of the
technique that might make it more useful or beneficial for
replenishment spares?
Ho, Item, Managers only procures when their comp cycle dictates. This




6. Does 3AIP require you to order spares earlier in the provi-
sioning process than you normally would? What problems does this
cause? For example, is there. an increased risk of obsolescence du«
to unstable design, inadequate demand data/ etc.?
Yes. There is an increased risk since .FCA/PCA (Functional Configuration
Audit/Physical Configuration Audit) have not been accomplished * Also, there
is little failure information available at this time,
7. what models, computer programs or formulas do you use for
determining spares quantity requirements (Hod-metric, ACTM, ARROWS,
etc. ) ? Doejs SAXP require you to use different models for determin-
ing spares quantities than you would normally use?
All spares are computed using the IRD system.
8. Do you normally complete SAIP buys j (if more than one choice
below applies, please indicate a percentage proportion for- each
arrangement)
a. at the same time and on the same contract as produc-
tion buys?
b. at same time as production buys but on different
contracts?
* c» through the prime contractor or with the prime's
•suppliers/vendors (the DCAs)?
d. at the same time with suppliers/vendors that the
prime places orders with them?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
CS-93 03::0AM FROM
•if
9. In your opinion, is it preferable to use the SAIP technique
with j
* a. The prime contractor
h. The prime's vendors/suppliers (DCAs)
Why? Placing orders for spares early in the program is a high risk; therefore
pacing orders with the prime allows us to change the Provisioned Item
Orders as part numbers change. This should ensure the latest configuration
of an item is shipped.
10. How db you r.ormally estimate the savings from a saip effort
and how accurate do you believe those estimates are (Quite
accurate, probably in the ball park, or worthless)
*
Our office does not estimate the savings. We do not have insight on the price
of the production buy.
11. What other procurement objectives/ if any, does SAIP conflict
with (Breakout, Competition, socio-Eoonomlc goals) and, how have
you. resolved these conflicts?
12 . What , do vou feel are the three primary risks or costs and
benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescense/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits obtweigh the risks?
Obsolete configuration and correct spares quantities.
No. I do not believe the cost savings outweighs the risks
C2-C9-93 09:30AM FROM
13. Can your command or activity provide copies of any historical
files, data, documents, or directives that would support informa-
tion you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If so
pleaee lis-t some examples* Is it possible for you to mail them to
me. or would I be required to make an on-sight visit to collect
them?
WR-ALC/LK may be able to assist.
14. Are there any other Government activities or contractors that
you think would be able and willing to provide information for this
research project. If so, please provide addresses, phone numbers





Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that
employed the SAIP technique? If so, please list systems on
which the SAIP technique was used.
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under
what circumstances the SAIP technique would be most appropri-
ate or beneficial. For example:
a. Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable
items only or is it appropriate for low cost consumables
spares?
b. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting
requirements for new systems or is it appropriate for
routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you
suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary thresholds, quanti-
ties, shipsets, etc.)
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of
time required to contract for spares? Why? Can you estimate
a percentage?
4 Another key issue for the Government is determining price
savings from a SAIP effort. Can you suggest any methods that
the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a
stand alone spares purchase (excluding a request for two
separate proposals) ? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
5. Please list any factors that you think contribute to SAIP
savings, if any, and indicate which are the most important.
(For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning
curve etc.
)
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP
spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the
same contract as production items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as produc-
tion items but on different contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor
or directly from the prime's suppliers/vendors (Design
Control Activities)?
e. some other arrangement? (Please describe)
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7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with
respect to SAIP appears to be coordination of the spares
contracting effort with the end item production contracting
effort. Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are
often different from those responsible for production con-
tracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are
missed due to a lack of consistent and timely notification of
ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end
item production purchases or, possibly, other service spares
purchases. Can you make any suggestions with respect to
improving coordination/communication in this area. (For
instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO
of opportunities for consolidating spares purchases with
production buys or other service spares buys via EDI?)
8
.
Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare
parts requirements in production contracts will discourage or
reduce the "buy- in" phenomenon since contractors will not be
able to count on follow- on spares sales to recover costs or to
make additional profit. Do you agree with this statement?
Please comment.
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits
associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT, obsolescence/config-
uration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the
benefits outweigh the risks?
10. Can your company or organization provide copies of any
historical files, data, documents, or directives that would
support information you provided above or that might be
otherwise helpful. If so please list some examples. Is it
possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to
make an on- sight visit to collect them?
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Date: March 29, 1993
Name of your Organization:
Your office or section: Programs
Your position: Senior Program Manager
Number of years in your current position:
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field:
Phone number:
1 . Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAiP technique was used.
We have proposed and received contracts in the past that contained both production
and spares in the same negotiation.
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
It would be beneficial to combine spares and production acquisition at all
times regardless of cost of spares.
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
Decreases as a function of initial buy. SAIP eliminates an entire process of a
spares order (no RFP, proposal, negotiation, contract award and associated
administration)
.
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
Savings will be considerable. Often times, small quantity spares buys result
in the contractor facing "minimum buys" when purchasing material for the end
product. It is difficult to ascertain savings without specific information.
However, simple learning curve analysis from production quantities prices to
spares quantities prices will show basic savings.
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
a. It is obviously easier for the contractor to manage one (1) contract vice
several. Also, separate orders are priced as individual quantities, and
since an individual order can be cancelled, it loses the effect of multi-
buy procurement.
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
The contractors ordering windows are typically driven by an MRP system. Suggest
the Government consider some sort of MRP system that can handle inputs from
several sites (i.e. ASO and various SPO's for production). Simple MRP systems
are available in the market place. Additionally, experience indicates we need
better coordination between APML and the IM/Weapons Manager at ASO.
8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
No. We have to support our prices regardless of what they are. DCMC and DCAA
are constantly auditing our proposals (both pre-award and post-award).
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
Benefits certainly outweigh any potential risks. The only risk that we can
think of is a potential risk with design changes mid-stream during production
which would impact a larger quantity of items in SAIP. Again, benefits
outweigh this potential risk.
10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
No.
1 1
. Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
No.
Date: 3/6/^3
Name of your Organization: PfV
Your office or section: CucTOMti^- SoPfoP^T*
Your position: MfWtG-ER, jL*JGr(,£7iC5
Number of years in your current position: 4
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: /5
Phone number:
1 . Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
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2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
L TRvj 7b fs??i?\ To £dtt^7VUt4(Er. ~l3P 5V% Or ITEMS (by (c<x
2. ftPf^ To f\LU ORDaXS \F E6£>uOM ICftU.
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
SfciP To Be. E^FEcTiv/k
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
TvUS US ffeb To (\uSoOEvV. A\fN^b^ S o-u 10%. D^PEnDr
o^tvm UhRDalfcpsi Aup T*e 6juiPaun| Processes
^
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
\p Mhuuf&crjftiH6 Setup
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Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
^-^aT^urchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
MO* /^OST Ccu-CRfcC*foiX€ UJOOUD RfYTHER Sell C^okeSl
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Product.
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
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10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
1 1
.
Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
i4£U£ OF \JAUJE
Date: 2/4/93
Name of your Organization: Provisioning and Support Research
Your office or section:
Your position: Manager
Number of years in your current position: Seven (7)
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: Thirty-Five (35)
Phone number:
*
1 . Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so, »
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used. f
A. B-1A (Prior to cancellation in 1977). Made a trip to MCAIR, St. Louis, Mo. to discuss SAIP with the
original author, Mr. C. Siler,
B. B-2A.
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
1. AFR 800-26 should be restricted to coveronly_high_cn
^t "-parable items foasicallylimited tn I.RIU)
since it is not onlyjot msLeffective from an administrative/management standpoint^ butalso because
obsolescence charges should be significant for a new Weapons System.....early on in the program.....and
generally for parts which have significantly low procurement leadtimes which dictates procurement later
on in the spares documentation cycle.
2. If SAIP is deemed a viable procurement methodology for initial support, then the apologetics for such
spares contracting would be even more applicable to follow-on and/or replenishment support
requirements.
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
Currently, SAIP contracting time is probably increased because of two reasons:
a. SAIP contracting and funding is not provided concurrently to industry with the production (install
contract.
b. The SAIP procurement/contracting methodology requires more understanding and better marketinj
methods on both sides of the fence, Le., government and industry for a less costly implementation.
Because ofjthese issues an estimated 50-100% more contractor involvement is required for SAIP.
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? Kow accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
SAIP contracting has always assumed there will be unit cost savings without regard for any increase in^ati
tooling, test equipment, etc If this SAIP concept were properly marketed by the government "up front" a bettei
/ \'~'\) understanding might not only be achieved for "install" unit pricing, but could also be achieved for "stand alone
AiSunit pricing during (and as an integral part of) production install proposal response by industry.
^
At this juncture, price estimates would be about as good as they would ever be, save for stand alone procuremeni
executed by the government in an "actuals" environment years later in the Program.
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
a. SAIP funding concurrent with production (install) funding.
b. Concurrent make/buy planning by industry.
c Consolidated material purchases by industry..„.but deferring fabrication, assembly, and testing until latex
on in the production build cycle so as to reduce obsolescence costs prior to completion of qualification
unit testing. For SAIP items such manufacturing activity could be deferred (on a leadtime away basis)
in the overall production delivery schedule to support first article delivery.
Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP herns through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
A combination of b. and c (through the prime contractor) is preferable since it mandates ILS participation by
both government and industry personnel to separately manage SAIP items notwithstanding the fact they (SAIP
items) are consolidated in a production (install) build schedule.
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
Again, the procurement, pricing, manufacture, and delivery of SAIP spares to support delivered and to be
delivered operational weapons systems has not been properly marketed by government personnel, Le., special
briefings, discussions, surveillance, during the RFQ/proposal/contract award program phases. If this were
accomplished, contractor personnel would be more responsive to government SAIP (contractual) requirements.
At present, SAIP is not as visible up front in the critical initial contracting phases as it^shouldbfe..
When the government authorizes funding for long lead material and/or weapons system procurement, that is
the time in the contracting cycle to identify and fund SAIP items. It is very difficult for ILS personnel in charge
of SAIP to follow and be continually aware of proposal/procurement activity which is strictly earmarked for
production install then relate such timing back to the government in the form of SAIP schedule "windows''.
What is happening is precisely the reverse of what ought to happen.
8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare pan requirements in productior
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able tc
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
I would not agree with such a thesis. In the first place, the SAIP requirement is strictly a government call, a
as such I can't envision any contractor turning down an end item production contract just because SAIP w
mandated. Secondly, if the contractor does a reasonable pricing/manufacturing job, he is more likely to recei
the follow on business. If not, he is not guaranteed follow on business anyway. The "buy in" is definite
separate to that of SAIP, since the contractor will have a definitive (known) quantity of spares up front as
larger base to amortize costs and gain a profit Without knowing the spares support quantities up front, it's ji
a guessing game as to what additional units he will receive to "recover costs", or make "additional" profit Final
if the government is really serious about applying the benefits of SAIP to every applicable contract then the
will be "no other game in town" and contractors will not have any other option.
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
As previously discussed, I believe the benefits outweigh any risks.
1 0. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
No.
1 1 . Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
The data that is extant regarding SAIP on the 8-2 Prograi would probably be little, if any help.
Date: ^-/- 9 3
Name of your Organization: P/V//«f/cwW
Your office or section : /*?** G /LA-TTC/? OoChJt/c^ -<~cs<rro*
7"
Your position: •*> orSQ (, £jt^
t
SuffofiZT Hfrfiwisu^. ^c/i \/&**J
Number of years in your current position: 2 t
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: 3 £~
Phone number:
1 . Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
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4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
use, fij^jJL JLa^ /^Jh^ j a*£2L s&xf Y^**^—
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? {Please describe)
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
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8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
vjUU kU^A c^iaA ^v^c. 5/»r/* J~^£*^J tL+*^Z^ ft*^^
JAX* pvrou*^ asm^> scUr~ otf*~*~o *^*- j*i**m~J r1*-* z*^-
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP




Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
^Vu^t &Se*£d^C^ a~~j jL*~-*fu>y
Date: 3///9'3
Name of your Organization:
~b£J
Your office or section: ^*T/J3/ *?£
Your position: ffflf//#£/&£.
Number of years in your current position: */
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: 7- /
Phone number: ^
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
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2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
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3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
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5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
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8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
flcdi? Aco/y? iv&~/Y c&7~a?~-/k,afa^'20
//O6&9015 Jy(y-y'A #vfc%& 7z^'0//! <3&(yc5f'
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks'
10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
Mb, /J4r~/f~'77&Z Z&VkZ
1 1 . Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
H^ saw**!* A/k^/yJ/J?/? /yo^ci^ya^ /£?"
Date: 4/12/93
Name of your Organization:
Your office or section: CUSTOMER MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS
Your position: BUSINESS ANALYST
Number of years in your current position: 5
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: 5
Phone number:
1 . Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
CONTRACTS: F< I PE SPARES
SECTION H-907, INITIAL PROVISIONING
F3 07 F119 EMD
PROVISIONING REQUIREMENTS STATEMENT (ATTACHMENT 19)
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
1). SAIP IS USUALLY MORE EFFECTIVE WHEN APPLIED TO HIGH DOLLAR (APPROX. $1,500)
LONG LEAD (APPROX. 18 MONTHS) SPARES.
2) SAIP TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN FOR INITIAL PROVISIONING, BUT CAREFUL COOPERATIVE
PLANNING MAY ALSO MAKE SAIP SUITABLE FOR REPLENISHMENT.
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
WHILE SAIP DOES NOT AFFECT THE AMOUNT OF TIME REQUIRED TO CONTRACT FOR SPARES, IT
DOES MAKE THE SPARES AVAILABLE IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER AS THE ORDER IS PLACED A LOT
EARLIER.
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
NO
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
A REDUCTION IN SPARES COSTS MAY BE REALIZED BY COMBINING THE SPARES REQUIREMENTS
WITH PRODUCTIVE INSTALLS AND POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF OTHER ORDERS IN THE CONTRACTORS
BUSINESS BASE.
REDUCED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS MAY RESULT FROM COMBINING PURCHASE ORDERS AND ISSUING
SINGLE CONTRACTS. HOWEVER, THESE COSTS ARE TYPICALLY EXPERIENCED BY FUNCTIONAL
GROUPS WHO CHARGE ON AN INDIRECT BASIS AND, THEREFORE, WILL HAVE AN INSIGNIFICANT
IMPACT TO ANY ONE CONTRACT.
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
BY PURCHASING THE SPARES DIRECTLY FROM THE PRIME CONTRACTOR, THE GOVERNMENT WILL
CAPITALIZE ON THE CONTRACTORS EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE HARDWARE. CONFIGURAT!
CONTROL IS ONE AREA WHERE THE PRIME WILL BE ABLE TO DELIVER THE CORRECT SPARE TO Tl
PROPER DESTINATION AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE PRICE.
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
TYPICALLY, SAIP APPLIES TO INITIAL PROVISIONING AND BOTH ARE USUALLY BOUGHT AND
FUNDED BY THE SAME AGENCY. ASO, WHO BUYS REPLENISHMENT SPARES, COULD COORDINATE
THEIR PROCUREMENTS WITH NAVAIR, WHO BUYS KITS AND ENGINES, BY COORDINATING
DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE NECESSARY
VISIBILITY. FUNDING TRANSFER IS ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE WHICH COULD AUTHORIZE A
SINGLE BUYING ACTIVITY ON ONE CONTRACT.
8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
DISAGREE. THE SAME "RANGE AND DEPTH" OF SPARES WILL BE REQUIRED REGARDLESS OF HOW
THEY ARE PURCHASED. DURING NEGOTIATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDED WITH COMPLETE
COST VISIBILITY AND WEIGHTED GUIDELINES TO ESTABLISH FEE RATES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED
THAT TYPICALLY PRODUCTION ENGINES ARE IN SERVICE MANY YEARS AFTER ENGINE PRODUCTION
ENDS, AND THEREFORE REPLENISHMENT SPARE PART PROCUREMENTS UP FRONT (I.E. SAIP BUY OUT)
ARE NOT COST EFFECTIVE FOR THE SYSTEM LIFE DUE TO THE INVENTORY CARRYING COSTS AND
COST OF OBSOLESCENCE.
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
THE PRIMARY RISK FOR A SAIP CANDIDATE IS DESIGN STABILITY. WHEN PROPERLY MANAGED,
THIS RISK CAN BE GREATLY REDUCED.
10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
NOT APPLICABLE.
1 1 . Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
THE ABOVE MENTIONED INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM PRATT & WHITNEY, BUT IS
AVAILABLE THROUGH THE FOIA.
Date: February 17/ 1993
Name of your Organization: :oUp
Your office or section: Integrated Logistics Support Operations
Your position: Vice President
Number of years in your current position: 3 yrs.
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: 35 years
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
SAIP is understood to mean Spares procurement concurrent with production in
order to achieve a price advantage. The various systems on which SAIP techniques
have been used are as follows:
o EF-111 Receiver/Processor Group and Avionics Modernization Program.
o F-14 Multi-mission capability (ECP1285) and modifications to "B" Model aircraft.
o E-2C Group I and II Modification Avionics Change.
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
1) SAIP should be restricted to high-cost repairables.
2) SAIP should be utilized for both/ if timing permits and funds are available.
Other considerations should include procurement of "Economic Order Quantities"
to maximize savings.
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
SAIP will decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares since
contractual processes; e.g., order, negotiation, sub-vendor purchase orders
and contract definitization, are performed once. Contract times are
estimated to be decreased by 15%.
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
Price savings estimates are too difficult to determine, since so many variables
must be considered; i.e., timing, quantity procured. Would not be able to
suggest methodology for determining savings.
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
Processing time and reduction of redundant actions both contribute to the
savings generated by SAIP, but the largest contributor, by far, is cost
reduction due to the volume (quantity) of the procurement. Other factors
trail behind the price break provided by buying in quantity.
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items is the preferable method. It is the simplest/ least expensive and most
direct way of contracting.
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
Following the SAIP procedures currently outlined is sufficient given that/ once
notified of a window by the prime contractor/ ttje contracting agency and any
support agencies perform their functions in a timely manner. This includes
identification of the requirement/ obligation of funds and contracting for the
procurement. AS© has been routinely advised of "windows" in the past/ however/
the time required for coordination with NAVAIR and the availability of funding
has caused disconnects.
8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
Do not agree with the comments forwarded by previous researchers. The contractor/
all things being even, will sell the same amount of spares over the life cycle
of the equipment. The potential for savings on the part of the government and the
contractor is an incentive for both parties to enter into a SAIP contract whenever
possible.
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
Risk/ in a SAIP contract/ is minimized Configuration problems are reduced
dueto the concurrent timing of the buy. PALT for the single procurement
should be shorter/ overall. Spares quantity disparities will self-correct/
either upward or downward as actual demand is factored into the procurement
formula.
10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
SAIP-type procurements have not been entered into with non-government customers.
FMS buys are considered to be government procurements.
1 1 . Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
The attached documentation (Primary Data Item Descriptions governing SAIP
and Excerpt of Draft MIL-STD-1561C) is provided to assist in researching the
subject. Historical data is not available.
Date: 10 Feb. 1993
Name of your Organization:
Your office or section Procurement/ DEPT. 763
Your position: Purchasing Agent
Number of years in your current position: 3
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field: ^
Phone number:
1. Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
Yes
* F-15 & F-18 Radar (Hughes) acquisition
* F-15 Radomes
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
I believe that SAIP is applicable to all spares that can be procured
at the same time with production, assuming "total" funding availability.
I think the United States Government should do a screening of all
requirements of parts and try to procure as many spares as possible
during production runs. This will spread out start-up costs, set-up
costs and material costs on all parts including the production quantities.
Some spare parts, when not bought with production, are extremely expensive
due to small quantities.
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
V.hy? Can you estimate a oercenrjg??
GereraHy SAIP decreases the time spent on contracting because the total
procurement can De accomplished with one negotiation and one purchase
orcer. It may spread out the lead time on the spares procurement in that
the production buy usually is large and would require an audit prior to
negotiations and a regular spares procurement might not require audits.
This is why the Government has to plan the requirements, forecast better
arc provide funding for both at the same time.
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
I don't know of any way to estimate SAIP savings except by using two
separate proposals. The two separate proposals are reaMty. The Govt.
should do a program to test the savings by way of two separate proposals
on many, varied parts. Take this data and use it as an estimate. It
rea^y would not be accurate since each procurement is different from
other procurements, there are different time frames, quantities and
Terms and Conditions.
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
1) Avoidance of Seller set-up costs.
(Flowing down to subcontractors)




(Administration of one P.O. instead of administration of two P.O.s)
3) Cost associated with larger quantities.
* Learning curves
* Qty discounts on Material
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
> a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
a. is preferable due to reduction in procurement time associated with
issuing two P.O.s and seller administration costs.
b. is not that much different though, since you will negotiate the two
quantities together and run the two P.O.s through the signature cycle
together. It does impact seller administration cost.
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
I do not believe that it is the contractor's responsibility to do the
Government's job for them. There should be a Dept. set aside just for
the coordination of SAIP issues. This Dept. should coordinate with all
ALCs and buying authorities to channel the procurements through one
buying command. This Dept. would have to keep records of "Estimated"
savings to justify their existence. If the department can not justify
their existence, then the SAIP concept will not work, but this Dept.
should have no problem justifying their existence with good management.
8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare pan requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
I disagree. Contractor's don't "buy-in" based on future spares but
on future production quantities. If the contractor's know the spares are
procured with production and Mmited spares will follow, then you might
get more realistic proposals.
9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
The primary risks are incorrect spare quantities and obsolescence/con-
figuration. The incorrect spare quantities can be minimized by good
planning and follow-up. The obsolescence is a risk. The benefits
are manufacturing cost reduction and administration cost reductions.
I believe that the benefits outweigh the risk associated with the
SAIP program, if the program is nanaged correctly.
10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so. can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP
opportunities/production windows? What type of items are purchased in this manner?
NO.
1 1. Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that m.ght be otherwise helpful, if
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
The above comments are my opinions and not necessarily these of MDA-E.
However, SAIP procurement of spares on the F-15 Radar goes back to the
late 1970' s, and there were documents provided by Hughes Aircraft on
the anticipated savings involved. This information is probably in MDA-E
permanent record files and may be difficult to locate at this time.
However, said documentation was provided to the Government at the time.
Date: 16 Mar 1993
Name of Organization: Integrated Loqistics Support (ILS)
Position: Manager, Logistics Engineering
Years in Current Position: 15
Years Experience in Acquisition Field: 35
Telephone:
1. Electronic Systems , has been utilizing the SAIP
technique for the past 20 years in order to reduce
ruRtoier costs. The SAIP process has been incorporated in
produced systems like the AN/ALR-56, AN/ALR-56A and
the AN/ALR-56M. LES is currently using the SAIP technique
during the production run of the AN/ALR-56M Advanced Radar
Warning Receiver.
2. (1) SAIP's greatest benefit is found in reduced costs for
expensive reparable items such as Weapon Replaceable
Assemblies (WRAs) and Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs)
.
The SAIP process is also appropriate when provisioning low
cost consumable spares since the provisioning cost will be
reduced. Another benefit is the availability of consumable
spares at the time of initial system deployment.
(2) SAIP should not be restricted to initial outfitting
requirements as long as the configuration baseline has
been maintained for the WRAs and SRAs. Although
appropriate, caution must be used when using SAIP for
routine replenishment requirements to ensure that the
configuration of the replenishment items meets the
required interchangeability criteria. History tells us
that the longer a production run matures, the more
difficult it becomes to acquire parts/material that meet
the initial production configuration.
From this contractor's experience, SAIP is a beneficial
and sagacious process that is only limited by production
capacity and the Customer's budget. Due to fiscal
constraints of the Customer, SAIP has not been exercised
to its maximum capability.
3. When the SAIP process is used in the realm of aircraft
electronics, spares contracting time is decreased by at
least 50 percent (estimated) . The majority of the
reduction is found in the elimination of the manufacture
lead time required for complex electronic components.
This savings is significant and further justifies the
maximum use of SAIP.
4. Life Cycle Cost models like LCC MOD/F-16 are available and
can be programed to compute the actual savings when using
the SAIP process.
5. Some other factors that contribute to SAIP savings are:
(Importance Rating (IR) based on a scale of 10 with 10
being the most important)
a. Increased Weapon System Availability due to spares
availability when prime equipment is delivered.
IR=10
b. Decreased Maintenance Manhours per Flying Hour due to
increased availability rates.
IR= 9
c. Enhances the Weapon System Maintenance Training
Program due to the higher availability rate. In other
words, more Fully Mission Capable Weapon Systems
equals increased possibility that the Weapon System
can be used for maintenance training vice aircrew
training.
IR= 6
d. Reduction in contractor administrative costs.
IR= 9




Reduced Weapon System cannibalization during initial
deployment thus enhancing the maintainability aspects
of the Weapon System while further reducing
Maintenance Manhours per Flying Hour. IR=8
g. Increased Weapon System Reliability due to decreased
cannibalization.
IR=8
6. (a.) Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the
same contract as production items is the preferred method
to institute SAIP since administrative costs are reduced;
production items and spares are the same configuration;
provisioning contract data requirements for prime
equipment and spares accomplished simultaneously; and
there is only one contract to manage.
7. recommends that the SAIP technique be an agenda
item for all Integrated Logistics Support Management Team
Meetings. The ILSMT forum puts the contractors, ASO and
the customer face-to-face to discuss problem areas and
develop Action Items to solve all logistical matters. The
ILSMT would be an ideal setting for the contractor to
present production schedules for ASO and Customer SAIP
action to reduce the SAIP window of opportunity loss.
8. SAIP experience tells us that governmental fiscal
constraints have limited the available SAIP benefits
in past contracts. If the SAIP technique were used to the
maximum extent possible, then the "buy-in" phenomenon
would be discouraged and reduced. However, based on the
1993 government cuts in the defense budget, the SAIP
technique is not close to maximization.
9. The primary benefits from SAIP are reduced Life Cycle
Costs; Spares availability during Prime Equipment
deployment in the field; increased operational readiness.
The primary risk associated with SAIP is the changing of
the configuration baseline to the point where new spares
would have to be procured while SAIP spares would be
condemned. The cost saving benefits do outweigh the
risks.
10. has never entered into a SAIP type contract with
non-government customers
.
11. Attached are documents which pertain to the SAIP process:
Atch 1: DD Form 1664, SAIP Data Item Description
Atch 2: LSA-155, Recommended Spares Parts Lists
for Spares Acquisition Integrated with
Logistics Atch 3: SAIP LSA Record
Atch 4: SAIP Process
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1 . Have you had any experience with contracts/programs that employed the SAIP technique? If so,
please list systems on which the SAIP technique was used.
2. One of the issues the Government must consider is under what circumstances the SAIP technique
would be most appropriate or beneficial. For example:.
1
.
Should SAIP be restricted to high cost repairable items only or is it appropriate for low cost
consumables spares?
2. Should SAIP be restricted to initial outfitting requirements for new systems or is it
appropriate for routine replenishment requirements?
What are your thoughts on these two questions? Can you suggest any other qualifiers? (Monetary
thresholds, quantities, shipsets, etc.)
3. Generally, does SAIP increase or decrease the amount of time required to contract for spares?
Why? Can you estimate a percentage?
4. Another key issue for the Government is determining price savings from a SAIP effort. Can you
suggest any methods that the Government might use to estimate savings of SAIP over a stand alone
spares purchase (excluding a request for two separate proposals)? How accurate do you believe such
estimates would be?
5. Please list factors that you think contribute to SAIP savings (if not discussed above) and indicate
which are the most important. (For example, reduction in administrative costs from multiple
procurement, avoidance of contractor setup costs, learning curve etc.)
5m. 9,
6. Which of the following approaches to contracting for SAIP spares is preferable? Why?
a. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time and on the same contract as production
items?
b. Purchasing SAIP items at the same time as production items but on different
contracts?
c. Purchasing SAIP items through the prime contractor or directly from the prime's
suppliers/vendors (Design Control Activities)?
e. Some other arrangement? (Please describe)
7. One of the most difficult issues for the Government with respect to SAIP appears to be
coordination of the spares contracting effort with the end item production contracting effort.
Offices/commands responsible for buying spares are often different from those responsible for
production contracts. ASO in particular feels opportunities for SAIP are missed due to a lack of
consistent and timely notification of ordering windows for integrating spares purchases with end item
production purchases or, possibly, other service spares purchases. Can you make any suggestions
with respect to improving coordination/communication in this area from the contractor's perspective?
(For instance, can contractors provide routine notification to ASO of opportunities for consolidating
spares purchases with production buys or other service spares buys via Electronic Data Interchange?)
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8. Previous researchers have suggested that combining spare part requirements in production
contracts will discourage or reduce the "buy-in" phenomenon since contractors will not be able to
count on follow-on spares sales to recover costs or to make additional profit. Do you agree with this
statement? Please comment.
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9. What do you feel are the primary risks and benefits associated with SAIP (monetary, PALT,
obsolescence/configuration, correct spares quantities, readiness, etc.)? Do the benefits outweigh the
risks?
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10. Have you entered into SAIP type contracts with non-Government customers? If so, can you
briefly explain the character/nature of these agreements? For example: Are spares requirements
included on production contracts? How are customer's purchasing offices notified about SAIP





Can your company or organization provide copies of any historical files, data, documents, or
directives that would support information you provided above or that might be otherwise helpful. If
so please list some examples. Is it possible for you to mail them to me, or would I be required to make
an on-sight visit to collect them?
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AIR-02 Policy and Procedures Memorandum /150A
Subj: SPARES ACQUISITION INTEGRATED IN PRODUCTION (SAIP)
Ref : (a) DOD Instruction 5000.2, Part 7, Section A, 23 Feb 91
(b) NAVAIR Integrated Logistics Support Statement of Work,
00-25-404, 23 Feb 90
(c) Data Item Description DI-V-7200
End: (1) Sample SAIP Letter
1. As we continue to improve the processes supporting our
customers, we need to be alert to fleet requirements. In most
cases, those requirements are provided to us directly from
program or weapon systems •* onagers in the form of procurement
requests (PRs) or engineering change proposals (ECPs) . However,
a major element of fleet support relates to supporting existing
systems through spare parts.
2. The existing process provides for incorporation of interim
and replenishment spares into the PR. Draft PRs are provided to
the Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , Philadelphia, for
incorporation of spares. This process, as it exists, has proved
inadequate in responding to ASO demand, funding volatility, and
prime contractor procurement cycle schedules. It also has
limited opportunities for combined buys.
3. Pursuant to references (a) and (b) , AIR-214 has prototyped a
SAIP process which expands the opportunities for combined buys by
phasing ASO spares requirements with prime contractor annual year
procurement order release cycles rather than the NAVAIR fiscal
year procurement cycle. Under this process, prime contractors
notify NAVAIR procuring contracting officers (PCOs) and ASO
weapons managers of their procurement order release schedule
planning data for annual year and other major buys and provide
them with a listing of the items comprising the planned releases.
aso weapons managers evaluate the planning information for any
combined buy opportunities and decide whether or not to initiate
a coordinated or concurrent stand-alone buy.
4. PCOs will initiate the SAIP process by letter to prime
contractors inviting their participation through notification of
procurement order release schedules and agreement to combine Navy
Subj; SPARES ACQUISITION INTEGRATED IN PRODUCTION (SAIP)
material requirements with their own* wherever possible, and to
the extent feasible within their existing procurement systems. A
sample letter is included as enclosure (l) . If the prime
contractor agrees to participate, the PCO will include in all
annual year^procurement contracts a SAIP line item structured as
a provisioned!tern ordering (PIO) line item with an associated
contract data requirement listing item, utilizing reference (c),
for submission of procurement order release schedule planning and
ordering information in the prime contractor's format as
necessary. Additionally, PCOs will report contractor specific
SAIP transactions in each prenegotiation business clearance and
SAIP process implementation progress per currently existing
quarterly Buy our Spares Smart reporting requirements.
5. A decision diagram outlining this SAIP process is included as
an attachment to enclosure (1)
•
6. CDP Bob Cowley is the AIR-02 point of contact on this
subject.
This PPM supercedes PPM #150.
/£/£•£<-<.
L. Vincent
Assistant Commander for Co
Distribution: Division Directors, Branch Heads, PCOs
Copy to: AIR-02, NADOC-02, AIR-114 , AIR-4111, AIR-412, AIR-
51123, ASO-00B
IAVY
NAVAL AIM SYSTtMS COMMAND
NAVAL Alff SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON OC *©»•»






Dear (Mr. /Mrs. /Ms
over the past twelve months, Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) prototyped a Spares Acquisition Integrated In
Production (SAIP) process providing for direct integration of
Aviation supply Office (ASO) spares requirements into a prime
contractor's annual year procurement order release schedule.
Under this initiative, the prime contractor prospectively
notified the appropriate ASO weapons manager and procuring
contracting officer (PCO) of procurement order release date
planning information for annual year and other major buys, and
provided a listing of the material comprising the release.
The weapons managers reviewed the prime contractor procurement
order release planning data for potential procurement synergy in
which common or similar items required by both parties could be
coordinated through concurrent or tandem buys and procured at a
lower economic cost to each. Enclosure (1) is a flowchart
detailing this SAIP process.
You are invited to participate in this process wherever possible,
and to the extent feasible within your existing procurement
system, by combining ASO or NAVAIRSYSCOM requirements with your
fiscal year annual production buy or other major requirements
purchase order releases to achieve economic ordering quantities.
Your participation would include providing cost and ordering
information
. in your existing format in order to document achieved
savings.
If you desire to participate or require further clarification,
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